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Melding the power of the state with the power of capitalism, state‐owned and state-
controlled enterprises continue to control the commanding heights of the Chinese 
economy even though market-oriented reforms have led to a rapid expansion of the 
private sector in China. This article reflects on how China’s practice of state 
capitalism challenges the world trading system and how WTO law, as interpreted by 
WTO Panels and the WTO Appellate Body (AB), addresses these challenges. The 
article concludes that the WTO Agreement on Subsides and Countervailing Measures 
(SCM Agreement) have been interpreted in such a manner that many key features of 
China’s state capitalism could easily be challenged by its trading partners in a WTO-
consistent manner.  This finding has profound implications for China’s domestic 
economic reforms, especially China’s ongoing reforms of its state-owned enterprises 
and commercial banks.  
 




Despite three decades of extensive state reform and privatization, state capitalism still 
looms large in many parts of the world. 1  State-owned enterprises (SOEs), 
development banks, public pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, among many other 
vehicles of governmental capital, have taken center stage in the global economy.2 The 
recent global financial crisis seems to have further enhanced the appeal of state 
capitalism in contrast to the liberal market model.3 In 2005 there was no single SOE 
among the top 10 firms of the Fortune Global 500 list. In 2013, there were three SOEs 
∗ Reader in Law, Lancaster University School of Law, UK. Email: michael.mingdu@gmail.com.  This 
research was partially funded by a FASS Research Grant.  
1 I Bremmer, The End of the Free Market (Portfolio, 2010) 18.  
2 A Musacchio & SG Lazzarini, ‘Leviathan in Business: Varieties of State Capitalism and Their 
Implications for Economic Performance’ (2012), 2 <http://hbswp.hbs.edu/item/7020.html>. 
3 N Ferguson, ‘We are All State Capitalist Now’, Foreign Policy (Feb, 2012); LC Backer, ‘Sovereign 
Investing in Times of Crisis: Global Regulation of Sovereign Wealth Funds, State-owned Enterprises, 
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among the top 10.4 A summit of founders and Chief Executive Offices (CEOs) of 
some of the world’s top companies, organized by Harvard Business School, identified 
state capitalism and its support for ‘national champions’- private or state-owned firms 
chosen to receive government assistance- as being among the ten most important 
threats to market capitalism.5  
 
     There is no unitary definition of the term ‘state capitalism’, despite its widespread 
use. Some early economists equated state capitalism with government intervention in 
markets; with central planning; with governments favoring big business and even with 
the outright expropriation of private property.6 More recently, Bremmer distinguishes 
state capitalism from command economies and free market economies. He defines it 
as ‘a system in which the state functions as the leading economic actor and uses 
markets primarily for political gain’.7 He explains:  
 
… Governments use various kinds of state-owned enterprises to manage the 
exploitation of resources they consider the state’s crown jewels and to create and 
maintain large number of jobs. They select privately owned companies to 
dominate certain economic sectors. They use so-called sovereign wealth funds to 
invest their extra cash in ways that maximize the state’s profits. In all three cases, 
the state is using markets to create wealth that can be directed as political 
officials see fit. And in all three cases the ultimate motive is not economic 
(maximizing growth) but political (maximizing the state’s power and the 
leadership’s chances of survival).8 
 
     In the same vein, Musacchio and Lazzarini describe state capitalism as being the 
‘widespread influence of the government in the economy, either by owning majority 
or minority equity positions in companies and/or through the provision of subsidized 
credit and/or other privileges to private companies’.9  
 
4 They are Sinopec Group, China National Petroleum and State Grid. All three are Chinese state-owned 
enterprises < http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2013/full_list/>.  
5 JL Bower, HB Leonard & LS Paine, Capitalism at Risk: Rethinking the Role of Business (Harvard 
Business Review Press 2011) 43-80.  
6 MN Rothbard, A Future of Peace and Capitalism (Allyn and Bacon 1973) 419.  
7 Bremmer (n 1) 4.   
8 ibid 4-5.  
9 Musacchio & Lazzarini (n 2) 4.  
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     China is a typical example of state capitalism.10 Market-oriented reforms have 
enabled China’s GDP to grow at an average rate of 9.5 % per year and its international 
trade by 18% in volume terms over the past 30 years. As a result, China is presently 
the world’s second largest national economy, a powerhouse in international trade and 
a major destination for foreign investment. 11  However, China’s economic 
development model is fundamentally different from the western liberal capitalism 
model. Melding the power of the state with the power of capitalism, the state‐owned 
and state-controlled portions of the economy continues to control the commanding 
heights of the Chinese economy even though market reforms have led to a rapid 
expansion of the private sector.12 Presently, SOEs constitute 80 percent of the value 
of the Chinese stock market and the Chinese government is the biggest shareholder in 
China’s 150 largest companies.13 In 2013, 95 Chinese firms appeared on the list of 
Fortune Global 500, compared with 79 in 2012, 69 in 2011, 54 in 2010 and 13 in 
2003, and 77 of the 95 firms on the list are SOEs.14 An OECD study, using data from 
2006, estimated that SOEs account for 29.7% of GDP, 40% of fixed investment and 
employ 40% of the urban labour force in China.15 Most strikingly, at least partly 
thanks to the Chinese government’s provision of a wide range of financial and 
regulatory advantages, the SOEs in China seem to have outperformed non-SOEs in 
10 R Gilson & CJ Milhaupt, ‘Sovereign Wealth Funds and Corporate Governance: A Minimalist 
Response to the New Mercantilism’ (2008) 60 Stan. L. Rev. 1346.  
11 WM Morrison, ‘China’s Economic Conditions’ (2012) Congressional Research Service 3.  
12 Yh Deng et al., ‘Monetary and Fiscal Stimuli, Ownership Structure, and China’s Housing Market’ 
(2011) NBER Working Paper 16871, 20 <http://www.nber.org/papers/w16871>. 
13 A Wooldridge, ‘The Visible Hand’ (2012) The Economist 4; See Also US- China Economic and 
Security Review Commission, 2011 Report to Congress (Nov. 2011) 40. The definition of SOEs is 
controversial. Official statistics from the Chinese Ministry of Finance defines SOEs as including only 
wholly state-owned companies. In this article, SOEs are defined more broadly to include wholly state-
owned SOEs and companies whose majority shares are owned by the Chinese government at various 
levels (including central, provincial and municipal levels).  
14 Wu Jie, , ‘Scrutinizing China’s Fortune Global 500 Companies’’, Guo Qi  (August 14, 2013) < 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2013-08/14/c_125166671.htm>. 
http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n1180/n1271/n20515/n2697206/15243512.html>.  
15 JY Lee, ‘State Owned Enterprises in China: Reviewing the Evidence’ (2009) OECD Occasional 
Paper <www.oecd.org/dataoecd/14/30/42095493.pdf>. Other estimates are higher, ranging from 30- 40 
percent or even above 50 percent of China’s economy depending on how the state sector is defined. 
See DL Scissors, ‘State-owned Enterprises in China’: Testimony before the US- China Economic and 
Security Review Commission (2011).  
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the past decade, while the opposite was true in the 1990s.16 It is now clear that the 
Chinese government no longer sees state-directed firms as a way-station on the road 
to liberal capitalism; rather, it is seen as a sustainable model in its own right.17  
 
     China’s practice of state capitalism has generated a heated debate regarding the 
merits of state-led development and the crisis of western liberal capitalism. Indeed, 
for the first time since 1850 the global capitalist system is experiencing the rapid rise 
of a continent-size capitalist power that espouses ideas, institutions, and interests 
fundamentally different from those of Anglo-American capitalism.18 It is frequently 
alleged that China’s state capitalism has distorted the Chinese domestic market as well 
as markets around the world.19 The challenge is most severe in China’s domestic 
market itself, as measures taken by the Chinese government to protect its SOEs have 
altered the competitive landscape for private enterprises and foreign companies, 
particularly in high-technology sectors.20 The next frontier is the global market. Since 
1999, as an essential part of the government-directed development model, China has 
adopted the ‘Go Global’ strategy, the essence of which is to promote the international 
operations of Chinese firms through outbound direct investment with a view to 
enhancing their international competitiveness.21 Due to the success of the ‘Go Global’ 
strategy, in recent years there has been a dramatic increase in Chinese outbound 
investment and an even larger potential for growth.22 Not surprisingly, at least 80 
percent of all Chinese outbound direct investment has been funded by Chinese 
SOEs.23 The close connections between Chinese SOEs and the Chinese government 
16 Xi Li et al, ‘A Model of China’s State Capitalism’ (2012), 2 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2061521>. 
17 A Gabriele, ‘The Role of the State in China’s Industrial Development: A Reassessment’ (2010) 52 
Comparative Economic Studies 348.  
18 CA McNally, ‘Sino-Capitalism: China’s Reemergence and the International Political Economy’ 
(2012) 64 (4) World Politics 765.  
19 EJ Drake, ‘Chinese State-owned and State-controlled Enterprises: Policy Options for Addressing 
Chinese State-owned Enterprises’, Testimony before the US- China Economic and Security Review 
Commission (2012); OECD, ‘State-Owned Enterprises: Trade Effects and Policy Implications- An 
interim Report’ (2010) DAF/CA/PRIV(2010) 1.  
20 USTR, 2011 Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance (2011) 61. 
21 Morrison (n 11) 20; M Silk and R Malish, ‘Are Chinese Companies Taking over the World?’ (2006) 
7 Chi. J. Int’l L. 112. 
22 N Salidjanova, ‘Going Out: An Overview of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment’ (2011) 
US- China Economic & Security Review Commission Staff Research Report 3.  
23 Wooldridge (n 13) 15. MOFCOM, 2009 Statistics Bulletin of Chinese Outward Foreign Direct 
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raises concerns that outbound investments decisions have been motivated by political 
rather than commercial objectives.24 The policymakers in some host countries have 
thus struggled to balance concerns relating to their national security and trade 
priorities on the one hand against the promises of inbound investment and 
employment growth on the other.25 
 
      At least for the foreseeable future, the coexistence of and competition between 
state capitalism and liberal capitalism seems to be inevitable. However, some 
questions arise including how can a fair level playing field in international economic 
relations be ensured if some companies enjoy various forms of overt or covert support 
from national governments? And how can legitimate concerns regarding fairness in 
international trade and investment be prevented from shading into xenophobia and 
protectionism? This article attempts to approach these questions through the lens of 
international trade law, embodied in the GATT/WTO system. Part II provides an 
introduction to the SOE reforms in China during the past three decades and to the 
various forms of support provided to SOEs by the Chinese government. Part III 
discusses how WTO law addresses the main features of China’s state capitalism and 
considers the implications of WTO case law for further reforms of the Chinese state 
sector, with particular emphasis on the role of the SCM Agreement. Part IV provides 
an overall conclusion.  
  
II. UNDERSTANDING CHINA’S STATE CAPITALISM   
 
A.  A Brief History of SOE Reforms in China  
 
To grasp the complexity of SOE reforms in China, it is essential to understand the 
pre-reform institutional environment that SOEs inhabited. After the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) defeated the Nationalist Party and founded the People’s 
Republic of China in 1949, the communist regime discarded the previous market 
economic order and, emulating the Soviet Union, created a socialist planned 
economy.26 The new economic structure was, by and large, a replica of the Leninist 
Investment (2010) 12.  
24 Jason Dean et al., ‘China’ State Capitalism’ Sparks a Global Backlash’ The Wall Street Journal 
(November 16, 2010) 
<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703514904575602731006315198.html>. 
25 DF Gordon, ‘The Competitive Challenges Posed by China’s State-owned Enterprises’ Testimony 
before the US- China Economic and Security Review Commission (February 15, 2012).  
26 ICY Hsu, The Rise of Modern China (6th edn, Oxford University Press 2000) 643.  
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model of a ‘state syndicate’, in which state ownership was the sole basis of almost all 
economic activities.27 Prior to 1978, virtually all firms in China were SOEs and they 
accounted for 78% of total industrial input and 64% of urban employment. During the 
period 1975-1980, SOEs accounted for over 84% of new investment in industrial 
fixed assets.28  
 
     In the socialist planned economy era, SOEs were basically production units rather 
than autonomous profit-seeking corporations. National and local government planning 
commissions decided what each SOE was to produce, their allocation of materials, 
capital goods and workers, and how production was to be organized in order to 
achieve output targets. The output was then sold to the government at a planned 
price. 29  The absence of autonomy and incentives were widely recognized as the 
central problems facing SOEs in the period prior to reform. Since the historic decision 
in 1978 to reform and open up the economy, the Chinese government has taken a 
gradual, experimental and pragmatic approach  - known as ‘crossing the river by 
touching the stone’  - to bring about the reform of  Chinese SOEs.30 This approach is 
in sharp contrast to the alternative, so-called ‘big bang’ approach which entails rapid 
large-scale privatization and which was adopted by the former Soviet Bloc.31 SOE 
reforms were deemed to be necessary in order to reduce economic losses, increase 
economic growth and raise living standards, from which the Chinese Communist 
Party (CPP) derives its governing legitimacy.32  
 
     The actual reforms passed through three broad phases.33 The first phase ran from 
the mid 1980s until the mid 1990s. Inspired by the success of the household 
27 Wu Jinglian, ‘China’s Economic Reform: Past, Present and Future’ (2000) 1 Perspectives 5 
<http://www.oycf.org/Perspectives2/5_043000/china.htm>.  
28 L Brandt, T Rawski & J Sutton, “China’s Industrial Development” in L Brandt, T Rawski & J Sutton 
(eds), China’s Great Economic Transformation (Cambridge University Press 2008).  
29 B Chiu & M Lewis, Reforming China’s State-Owned Enterprises and Banks (Edward Elgar 
Publishing 2006) 61.  
30 Xu Chenggang, ‘The Fundamental Institutions of China’s Reforms and Development’ (2011) 49 (4) 
The Journal of Economic Literature 1076- 1151; Lin Justin Yifu et al, ‘Competition, Policy Burdens, 
and State-owned Enterprise Reform’ (1998) 88 (2) American Economic Review 422-27.  
31 MX Pei, China’s Trapped Transition: The Limits of Developmental Autocracy (Harvard University 
Press 2006) 22.  
32 Li (n 16) 9. 
33 Deng (n 12) 9; S Green and GS Liu, ‘China’s Industrial Reform Strategy: Retreat and Retain’ in S 
Green and GS Liu (eds), Exit the Dragon? Privatization and State Control in China (Blackwell 
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responsibility system in the rural reforms in the early 1980s, the first phase focused on 
increasing enterprise autonomy and incentivizing SOE managers to meet performance 
targets by allowing them to retain profit. First, a ‘dual-track approach’ let SOEs 
produce beyond their quotas, sell the excess at market prices, and keep the proceeds 
as corporate profits, with the government continuing to set quotas.34 Later, a ‘contract 
responsibility system’ was introduced for most small and medium-sized SOEs, under 
which SOE managers signed contracts with the government giving them the right to 
run day-to-day operation, while the firm remained a state asset. Profits were shared 
between the enterprises and the state in accordance with the terms of the contract.35 
There is evidence that SOEs made some productivity gains as a result of these firm-
level reforms.36 However, these reforms were soon viewed as inherently flawed and 
inadequate to deal with new problems. For example, the ‘dual track’ approach 
allowed administrative interference and created incentives for arbitraging between 
planned and market prices.37 It increased the pervasiveness of corruption in China.38 
Similarly, the contract responsibility system did not solve the short-termism of 
management behavior.  Because the contracts were usually easy to realize when firms 
performed well but hard to implement when firms could not meet the contractual 
performance targets, managers were able to exploit their effective control over SOE 
assets at the expense of the state, damaging firms’ long-term development.39 Due to 
increasing competition from the private sector, including foreign-invested enterprises 
and township and village enterprises, SOEs stacked up huge losses.40 During 1978-
1993, the share of net industrial output generated by SOEs decreased sharply, even 
though virtually none closed during this period. About 40% of SOEs were loss-
Publishing 2006) 16.  
34 Deng, ibid 9.  
35 Li Wei, ‘The Impact of Economic Reform on the Performance of Chinese State Sector Enterprises: 
1980-1989’ (1997) 105 (5) Journal of Political Economy 1080-1106.  
36 MM Shirley and C Xu, ‘Empirical Evidence of Performance Contracts: Evidence from China’ (2001) 
17 Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 168-200. 
37 S Green and GS liu (n 33) 17.  
38 W Li, ‘Measuring Corruption under China’s Dual Track System’ (2002) 
<http://faculty.darden.virginia.edu/liw/papers/measuring-corruption.pdf>. 
39 YY Qian, ‘Enterprise Reform in China: Agency Problems and Political Control’ (1996) 4 (2) 
Economics in Transition 427-447.  
40 SM Li, SH Li and WY Zhang, ‘The Road to Capitalism: Competition and Institutional Change in 
China’(2000) 28 Journal of Comparative Economics 269-292; YZ Cao, YY Qian and BB Weingast, 
‘From Federalism, Chinese Style to Privatization, Chinese Style’(1999) 7 Economics in Transition 
103-131.  
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makers in 1994 and their debt to equity ratio increased to 200%. These developments 
put substantial pressure on government revenue, its fiscal burdens and banking 
stability.41 
  
     The second phase of SOE reforms commenced after the historic Southern tour of 
Deng xiaoping in 1992, when the goal of China’s economic reform became the 
establishment of a socialist market economy. The Third Plenary Session of the 
Fourteenth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CCCPC) announced 
the Decision on Issues Regarding the Establishment of a Socialist Market Economic 
System. The Decision required SOEs to be modern enterprises characterized by ‘clear 
property rights, well-defined power and responsibility, separation of enterprise from 
government, and scientific management’.42 In practice, corporatization was seen as a 
means of achieving the reform goals set by the CCP. The first general Chinese 
Company Law was enacted in order to  provide for the incorporation of SOEs in 1994. 
Thereafter, newly corporatized SOEs proliferated all over the country.43 In 1999 a 
CCP decision, adopted at the Fourth Plenary Sessions of the Fifteenth CCCPC, 
outlined a clear roadmap to transform SOEs into competitive modern corporations. 
First, it provided that a corporate governance structure providing checks and balances 
between the owner and the manager should be at the core of the enterprise system. 
Second, it required that whilst a minority of SOEs should remain state monopolies, 
the rest should actively develop into corporations with multiple equity-holders, 
including non-state equity investment. Third, it encouraged well-performing SOEs to 
become listed on domestic or overseas stock markets.44  
 
     Along with corporatization, at the core of the reforms to SOE in the 1990s was the 
central government policy of ‘nurturing the large and letting the small go’, a reference 
to a policy of concentrating the government’s resources on the larger SOEs, while 
relaxing state control over smaller SOEs.45 The central government explicitly pursued 
41 Li (n 16) 9.  
42 Decision on Issues Regarding the Establishment of a Socialist Market Economic System, para. 1 (2) 
<http://finance.ifeng.com/opinion/jjsh/20090906/1199906.shtml>.  
43 LY Zhang, ‘The Roles of Corporatization and Stock Market Listing in Reforming China’s State 
Industry’ (2002) 32 World Development 2031.  
44 Decision on Several Important Issues Regarding Reform and Development of SOEs, paras. 5(3) and 
7(3) <http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/71380/71382/71386/4837883.html>. J Wu, Understanding 
the Interpreting Chinese Economic Reform (Thomason Higher Education, 2005) 155-8. 
45 M Mattlin, ‘Chinese Strategic State-Owned Enterprises and Ownership Control’ (2010) 4 (6) BICCS 
Asia Paper 8.  
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the strategy of retaining state control of 500-1,000 large SOEs in strategic sectors. At 
the same time, the Chinese government retreated from labor-intensive competitive 
sectors such as textiles, building materials, food processing, and electronics.46 Many 
small and medium-sized SOEs were assessed for reorganization, bankruptcy, debt 
write-offs, merger into partnerships, leasing, contractual operation, or sales.47 After 
this round of reform, the SOEs were streamlined and their advantageous position was 
further reinforced in the upstream and strategic industries. 
 
     The third phase of SOE reforms started in 2003, and focused on reforming 
property rights and corporate governance in large SOEs.48 Chinese company law and 
securities law were revised to achieve more congruence between Chinese law and 
practice and that of countries with more developed capital markets.49 One key reform 
was the establishment of the State Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission (SASAC), a quasi-governmental, ministerial level agency operating 
directly under the State Council, to oversee the management of the SOEs. Prior to the 
creation of the SASAC, many analysts pointed to the absence of an ultimate principal 
as a key problem. 50  Theoretically the state, on behalf of all the Chinese people, 
formally owns SOE assets, but it is not readily apparent who represents the state. In 
reality, control rights and residual cash-flow rights were not clearly defined and 
invariably dispersed among multiple bureaus, each with different interests to pursue.51 
As a result, no single entity was ultimately responsible for an SOE’s performance. 
The SASAC was primarily designed to fulfill the state’s ownership function, 
combining the administrative functions previously carried out by various government 
agencies. The Law on State-owned Assets of Enterprises in 2008 formally recognizes 
the SASAC as an ‘investor’ and assigns the SASAC the legal rights and duties of a 
shareholder, holding SOE shares on behalf of the State.52 As an investor, the SASAC 
enjoys an owner’s equity rights and assumes legal liabilities under Chinese Company 
46 S Green & GS Liu (n 33) 2.  
47 Deng (n 12) 10.  
48 ibid 11.  
49 JV Feinerman, ‘New Hope of Corporate Governance in China?’ (2007) The China Quarterly 590-
612; JH Liu & KB Pibler, ‘Corporate Governance of Business Organizations in the People’s Republic 
of China: The Legal Framework after the Revision of the Company Law in 2005’ (2010) 1-48 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1695888>   
50 DC Clarke, ‘Corporate Governance in China: An Overview’ (2003) 14 China Economic Review 494.  
51 H Sheng & N Zhao, China’s State-Owned Enterprises: Nature, Performance and Reform (World 
Scientific Publishing Company 2012) 267.  
52 Chapter 2 of PRC Law on State-owned Assets of Enterprises.  
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Law but it does not intervene directly in SOE operations, so that the ownership rights 
are separated from those of management.53 Chinese leaders and SASAC officials have 
repeatedly emphasized that the SASAC must not meddle in the business operations of 
SOEs.54 
 
     The establishment of the SASAC contains both centralizing and decentralizing 
features. On the one hand the principle of local control over local SOEs was clarified 
and institutionalized by clearly separating central, provincial and municipal SOEs and 
handing control over them to SASAC offices at respective jurisdictional levels.55 On 
the other hand, the SASAC serves as a unitary holding company for those key central 
SOEs that have been selected by the government to be China’s national champions 
and future top global companies. When it was established in 2003, 196 central SOEs 
were under the management of the SASAC, out of a national total of nearly 120,000. 
Under the oversight of SASAC, by July 2013 that number was reduced to 114, as the 
smaller and less competitive firms were absorbed by the larger ones.56 Although not 
large in number, the size and importance of central SOEs to the national economy in 
many respects surpass that of all the other SOEs combined. In 2009, the central SOEs 
accounted for roughly 40% of total non-financial SOE assets, 60% of sales and over 
70% of total profits.57 Their listed subsidiaries represent around one-third of the entire 
valuation of the Chinese domestic stock exchange. 58This makes the SASAC ‘the 
world largest controlling shareholder’.59   
 
     The SASAC has a broad mandate that includes drafting laws and regulations 
regarding state-owned assets, managing and restructuring state assets so that their 
value develops positively, hiring and firing executives of SOEs under its supervision 
and pushing forward further reforms of SOEs.60 Though there have been doubts over 
53 Chiu & Lewis (n 29) 122.  
54 LM Hou, ‘SASAC Chief says that the SASAC will not be SOEs’ Popo and Boss’ 
<http://money.163.com/08/0810/16/4J0FNR4U00251OB6.html> 
55 Mattlin (n 45) 8.  
56 See the most recent updated list of central enterprises at 
<http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n1180/n1226/n2425/index.html> 
57 Deng (n 12) 21 
58 Mattlin (n 45) 9.  
59 Boston Consulting Group, ‘SASAC: China’s Megashareholder’ (2007) 
<https://www.bcgperspectives.com/content/articles/globalization_strategy_sasac_chinas_megasharehol
der/>. 
60 SASAC, Main Functions and Responsibilities of SASAC, 
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whether the SASAC is always able to exercise its authority effectively, the SASAC is 
a very powerful state agencyand since its establishment the SASAC has been pushing 
forward SOE reforms aggressively. 61   
 
     As mighty leviathans of the Chinese planned economy, Chinese SOEs were long 
depicted as ‘industrial dinosaurs’, ‘muscle-bound goons’ or the ‘relics of a failed 
economic experiment’, and characterized as possessing a lack of managerial flair, 
little concern for profit, low employee motivation and mobility and a tendency to 
maximize corporate size. 62  After the extensive reforms of the past two decades, 
Chinese SOEs have evolved from being parts of government ministries involved in 
production activities to legally stand-alone enterprises that are empowered to make 
their own managerial, operational and production decisions. It is unrealistic today to 
uphold the simplistic and pessimistic view of Chinese SOEs as industrial and 
commercial dinosaurs fit only for dismemberment or bankruptcy. Modern corporate 
governance systems have been established in Chinese SOEs, some of which can rival 
the best private companies in the world. Many SOEs have vastly improved their 
financial performance in the past decade and have proactively engaged in global 
partnerships and acquisitions.63  
 
B. SOEs and the Chinese Party-State 
 
One core task of SOE reforms in China is the separation of government functions 
from enterprise management. Following the reforms, Government officials are asked 
not to intervene in the day to day business operations of SOEs.64 Nevertheless, the 
management of SOEs continues to be influenced by policy considerations. To 
understand the behavioral logic of Chinese SOEs in both national and international 
markets, it is enlightening to look at the incentives offered to corporate executives in 
<http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n1180/n3123702/n3123717/n3162319/index.html> 
61 B Naughon, ‘SASAC Rising’, China Leadership Monitor No. 14 
<http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/clm14_bn.pdf> ; CE Walter and FJT Howie, Red 
Capitalism (John Wiley & Sons Ltd 2012)189-191. 
62 J Hassard et al., ‘China’s State-owned Enterprises: Economic Reform and Organizational 
Restructuring’ (2010) 23 (5) Journal of Organizational Change Management 501; J R Woetzel, 
Reassessing China’s State-owned Enterprises (July, 2008) The McKinsey Quarterly 1.  
63 A Musacchio & F Flores-Macias, ‘The Return of State-owned Enterprises’ (2009) Harvard 
International Review 5.   
64 WY Li & L Putterman, ‘Reforming Chinese SOEs: An Overview’ (2008) 50 Comparative Economic 
Studies 353-380.  
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central SOEs.65  
 
     The leaders of central SOEs are appointed in accordance with a highly 
institutionalized sharing arrangement between the CCP and the SASAC. The top 
positions in fifty-four key central SOEs, including the Chairman of the board of 
directors, chief executive officer and party secretary, are appointed and evaluated 
directly by the Central Organization Department (COD) of the CCP.66 These SOE 
executives hold ministerial rank and many are members or alternates of the powerful 
Central Committee of the CCP.67 Deputy positions in these fifty-four enterprises, and 
appointments and evaluations of top executives in the remaining central SOEs, are 
made by the SASAC, usually with inputs from various party organs and ministries 
involved in supervising relevant business operations and are subject to approval by 
the State Council.68 Still, the COD wields tremendous power behind the scenes and is 
the real decision maker when it comes to making senior personnel.69 The Interim 
Provisions on the Management of Executives in Central SOEs, issued jointly by the 
Central Committee of CCP and the State Council in December 2009, enshrines the 
principle of ‘absolute control of the (SOE) executives by the party (CCP)’.70 In short, 
the CCP and the SASAC are able to ensure their control over China’s most powerful 
business groups by virtue of their power to appoint and remove its top management.71 
 
     The COD and the SASAC have developed a sophisticated performance evaluation 
65 KE Brodsgaard, ‘Politics and Business Group Formation in China: The Party in Control?’ (2012) 
The China Quarterly 626.  
66 B Naughton, ‘SASAC and Rising Corporate Power in China’ (2008) China Leadership Monitor No. 
24, 2.  
67 Walter and Howie (n 61) 187.  
68 LW Lin and CJ. Milhaupt, ‘We are the National Champions: Understanding the Mechanisms of State 
Capitalism in China’ (2011) The Centre for Law and Economic Studies Working Paper No. 409, 38 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1952623> 
69 A Szamosszegi & C Kyle, ‘An Analysis of State-owned Enterprises and State Capitalism in 
China’(2011), Report to US- China Economic and Security Review Commission 76; MX Pei, ‘The 
Dark Side of China’s Rise’, Foreign Policy (March, 2006) 
<http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2006/02/17/the_dark_side_of_chinas_rise> 
70 Para 3(1) of Interim Provisions 
<http://www.comac.cc/rlzy/zczd/201108/12/t20110812_449071.shtml>  
71 Walter and Howie (n 61) 193; R McGregor, The Party: The Secret World of China’s Communist 
Rulers (Harper Perennial 2011) 49.   
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system for top executives of central SOEs.72 In both  annual and triennial evaluations,  
their performance – and their rewards and career prospects – are gauged by referring 
to a range of indicators. 73  Financial performance, though an important indicator 
accounting for 50% of the evaluation, is not the sole criteria. ‘Political qualities’, i.e., 
how well SOE executives adhere to CCP priorities and government directions, is also 
an important evaluation criterion.74  
 
     SOE executives therefore face two sets of incentives. On the one hand, they want 
the SOEs they manage to be profitable because their evaluations are based on the 
firm’s financial performance. On the other hand, their career paths are ultimately 
determined by the CCP which is equally, if not more, concerned with how well the 
executives respond to the government directions and carry out the goals of the state. A 
top SOE executive judged unresponsive to the CCP policies risks not being promoted, 
or even demoted, at the end of his three-year term even if the SOE performs well.75 
These dual criteria for evaluating SOE top executives- to deliver profits and serve the 
government interests- are often in alignment. It is reasonable to assume that a 
commercially successful SOE is often in the best interests of its owner, the Chinese 
government. However, where a SOE’s financial interests and state goals are in 
conflict, the incentive schemes strongly encourage compliance with state interests 
rather than the financial interests of the company and of other non-state 
shareholders.76  
 
     Research has shown that state goals dominate SOE executive decision-making. Nie 
and his colleagues found that winning political promotion is more important than 
financial compensation in shaping executive behavior. 77 Since the majority of top 
positions at key central SOEs are at vice-ministerial rank, SOE leaders usually hope to 
be transferred to senior positions in government bureaucracies or party organs so that 
they could subsequently be promoted even further.78 There is also evidence that the 
72 Provisional Measures Concerning the Integrated Evaluation of the Top Management Teams and 
Managers of the Central Enterprises, CCP Organization Department Doc. No. 17 (2009). 
73 ibid art 4.  
74 ibid art 9 and 10. 
75 Deng (n 12) 16.  
76 Szamosszegi & Kyle (n 69) 79.  
77 Yang Ruilong, Wang yuan and Nie Huihua, ‘The Promotion Mechanim of ‘Quasi-officials’: Evidence 
from Chinese Central Enterprises’ (2013) GuanLi ShiJie, 
<http://cfos.ruc.edu.cn/Article/UploadFiles/201304/2013040112405165.pdf> 
78 ibid.  
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turnover of top executives in listed Chinese SOEs is significantly less closely related 
to financial performance indicators than in other listed firms.79 For example, in 2008, 
when global fuel prices were skyrocketing, Sinopec Corp, a large Chinese SOE, duly 
complied with the government’s decision to maintain low gasoline prices and, as a 
result, racked up huge losses.80 In 2009, the Chinese government’s fiscal stimulus 
measures required significant amounts of lending by state‐owned banks and 
investments by SOEs. Deng found that bank lending went primarily to SOEs which 
subsequently used those funds to invest in real estate. The banks lent stimulus money 
without the due diligence typically used, and the SOEs paid more for their 
acquisitions than non‐SOEs who purchased otherwise identical properties.81 It was 
also reported that the Aluminum Company of China (Chinalco) was handpicked by 
the Chinese government to acquire significant stakes in an Australian mining 
company Rio-Tinto; its funding was directly approved by the State Council and its 
CEO was promoted to a State Council position days after the final deal was 
negotiated.82 These examples indicate that Chinese SOEs, especially central SOEs, 
are more than a purely financial investment for the Chinese party-state. The SASAC, 
as the organizational manifestation of the Chinese party-state in its role as a 
controlling shareholder, seeks to maximize a range of benefits - extending from state 
revenues to technological prowess and from soft power abroad to regime survival at 
home – rather than maximizing shareholder value.83  
 
C. Identification of Strategic and Pillar Industries  
 
On December 5, 2006, the SASAC issued its Guiding Opinion on Promoting the 
Adjustment of State-Owned Capital and the Reorganization of State-Owned 
Enterprises (the Guiding Opinion).84 This set out a major policy of promoting the 
concentration of state-owned capital in major industries and on key fields, enhancing 
the controlling power of the state-owned economy and underlining its leading role. 
79 ZY Zhao, ZS Yang and CE Bai, ‘The Empirical Study of the Effect on the Top Management 
Turnover in China’s Listed Companies’ (2007) Journal of Finance Research 76-89.  
80 Szamosszegi & Kyle (n 69) 46.  
81 Deng (n 12) 7.  
82 McGregor (n 71) 58-61.  
83 Lin and Milhaupt (n 68) 46; See CE Bai, JY Lu and ZG Tao, ‘The Multitask Theory of State 
Enterprise Reform: Empirical Evidence from China’ (2006) 96 (2) American Economic Review 354.   
84 Notice of the General Office of the State Council on Forwarding the Guiding Opinions of the 
SASAC about Promoting the Adjustment of State-Owned Capital and the Reorganization of State-
Owned Enterprises (No. 97 [2006] of the General Office of the State Council, 5 December 2006).  
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Major industries and key fields mainly include industries concerning national security, 
major infrastructure and important mineral resources, industries that provide essential 
public goods and services, as well as key enterprises in pillar and high-tech 
industries.85 The former SASAC chairman Li Rongrong has clarified the different 
roles of SOEs in strategic, pillar and other industries. According to Li, strategic 
industries relate to national security and are key to the national economy. They cover 
seven industries: defense, electric power and grid, petroleum and petrochemical, 
telecommunications, coal, civil aviation, and shipping.86 The state would maintain 
absolute control in these strategic sectors, either through sole ownership or by having 
an absolute controlling stake, and state-owned assets should be increased. 87  By 
comparison, the state has a notably smaller  role in basic and pillar industries, which 
include equipment manufacturing, the auto industry, information technology, 
construction, iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, chemicals, surveying and design and 
technology. In this group, the state must maintain an absolute or conditional relative 
controlling stake, and the influence of state ownership should be enhanced even if the 
amount of state capital is reduced. 88 Other industries include trading, investment, 
medicine, construction materials, agriculture and geological prospecting, in which the 
state should maintain the necessary degree of influence by holding a controlling stake 
in leading enterprises in some influential sectors, although the number of SOEs in 
these sectors should be clearly reduced.89   
 
     The identification of strategic and pillar industries appears to have been made on 
an ad hoc basis. On the one hand, as Naughton pointed out, even though the 
machinery equipment industry as a whole is recognized as a pillar industry, some 
subsectors of that industry are clearly not considered to be so in practice.90 On the 
other hand, from time to time, newly emerging industries have been identified as new 
strategic or pillar industries. For example, China’s State Council unveiled the “12th 
Five-Year Development Plan for National Strategic Emerging Industries” in July 2012. 
85 ibid.  
86 The level of state ownership in the banking sectors is comparable to that of China’s strategic 
industries. The SASAC did not name banking sector as strategic because the banking sector in China is 
subject to a separate regulatory regime. See Deng (n 12) 23. 
87 SASAC, ‘The State Sector Shall Keep Absolute Control over Seven Industries’ 
<http://www.gov.cn/ztzl/2006-12/18/content_472256.htm>  
88 ibid.  
89 ibid.  
90 B Naughton, ‘State-Owned Enterprises in China’ (2011) Testimony before the US- China Economic 
and Security Review Commission.  
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The plan identified seven strategic emerging industries, namely, the energy-saving 
and environmental protection industry; the new-generation information technology 
industry, the biology industry, the high-end equipment manufacturing industry, the 
new energy auto industry, the new energy industry and the new material industry. The 
State Council aims to make the first three pillar industries and last four guiding 
industries in China by 2020.91 In the light of the role assigned to state ownership in 
strategic and pillar industries by the SASAC, SOEs will necessarily play a vital role in 
developing these strategic emerging industries going forward.  
 
D. State Support of SOEs: Sources of Competitive Advantages  
 
Several possible sources of market distortions can arise as a result of the competitive 
advantages that some SOEs have over non-state enterprises. Such advantages are not 
necessarily based on better performance, superior efficiency, better technology or 
superior management skills but are merely government-created. 92 These advantages 
can be roughly classified into financial, regulatory and other forms of advantage.93  
 
1. Financial Advantages 
 
Tax reductions and exemptions: The Chinese government has used lower tax rates to 
reward SOEs and subsidiaries for undertaking investments, procuring goods and 
services, and performing other activities that market incentives alone would not 
support.94 For example, the US regulatory filings of Chinalco showed that the firm 
benefitted from a RMB 92.4 million tax credit for purchasing certain domestic 
equipment in 2008.95   
 
     Direct subsidization: Another form of benefit conferred upon SOE subsidiaries is 
the direct transfer of funds through grants or capital injections. One example is the 
Chinese government’s grant of RMB 50.9 billion to Sinopec Corp to cover the 
91 State Council, the 12th Five-Year Development Plan for National Strategic Emerging Industries, 
Guofa [2012], No.28, 9 July 2012.  
92 A Capobianco & H Christiansen, ‘Competitive Neutrality and State- Owned Enterprises: Challenges 
and Policy Options’ (2011) OECD Corporate Governance Working Paper No.1, 11.  
93 J Nakagawa, ‘Regulatory Harmonization through FTAs and BITs: Regulation of State Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs)’ (2012) SIEL Working Paper No. 2012/55, 3.  
94 Szamosszegi & Kyle (n 69) 45.  
95 ibid. The program was later discontinued in response to a WTO investigation into China’s tax 
regime.  
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company’s losses in 2008.96  
 
     Low-cost capital from state-controlled banks: Despite changes in the legal 
framework which are ostensibly aimed at pushing the state-owned commercial banks 
towards more commercially oriented lending patterns, China’s state-owned 
commercial banks continue to favor SOEs and make loans to them on preferential 
terms.97 The Economist reported that Chinese SOEs borrow from state-owned banks 
at below-market rates of only 1.6 percent interest, compared to the 4.7 percent interest 
rate charged to private companies.98 Other benefits include writing off loans which 
SOEs which are unable to repay or continuously rolling over the principal.99 In 2009 
approximately 85 percent of China’s 1.4 trillion in bank stimulus loans went to 
SOEs.100 This preference persisted despite generally low levels of profitability or even 
the un-creditworthiness of some SOEs and more rapid growth in other segments of 
the Chinese economy. As a result of the bias toward SOEs in bank lending, the private 
sector receives a relatively small share of credit from the formal financial sector in 
China and has come to rely on private financing mechanisms.101  
 
2. Regulatory Advantages  
 
SOEs are often not subject to the same costly regulatory regimes as private 
companies, resulting in their enjoying lower operating costs than their private 
competitors. 102  Examples of such preferential treatment include exemptions from 
antitrust enforcement and bankruptcy rules, preferential access to raw materials, 
favourable dividend policies, and preference in government procurement. 103 
 
     Monopolies. Some Chinese SOEs are granted exclusive rights over the activities 
that they are mandated to pursue. As discussed above, the state sector is mandated to 
control strategic and pillar industries and in these sectors, both domestic and foreign 
private capital is severely restricted and Chinese SOEs enjoy de facto exemption from 
96 Ibid 20.  
97 Walter and Howie (n 61) 25.   
98 Wooldridge (n 13) 15. 
99 Julia Ya Qin, ‘WTO Regulation of Subsidies to State-owned Enterprises (SOEs)- A Critical Appraisal 
of the China Accession Protocol’ (2003) 7(4) JIEL 876.  
100 Wooldridge (n 13) 7.  
101 KS Tsai, Back-Alley Banking: Private Entrepreneurs in China (Cornell University Press 2002) 10.  
102 A Capobianco and H Christiansen (n 92) 6.  
103 The Economist, The State Advances (Oct 6, 2012).   
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antitrust enforcement.104 The office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) 
has found that ‘China has added a variety of restrictions on investment that appear 
designed to shield inefficient or monopolistic Chinese enterprises from foreign 
competition’.105  
 
     Captive equity. SOEs equity is generally ‘locked in’, i.e. control of an SOE cannot 
be transferred as easily as would be the case in privately-owned firms. Under the 
State-owned Asset Law of Enterprises, transfer of state shares require the prior 
approval of the SASAC or its local office, even with respect to transactions over 
which it does not have veto power as a shareholder under Chinese Company Law.106 
Some Chinese courts have held that contracts for the transfer of state-owned shares 
without prior approval are not enforceable or invalid, despite their being consistent 
with Chinese Company Law.107 The inability to transfer ownership rights results in a 
number of advantages for SOEs. First, because they are not subject to the threat of 
takeovers, SOEs can generate losses for a long period of time without fear of 
bankruptcy.108 Second, SOEs are more inclined to engage in anti-competitive (and 
rarely profitable) exclusionary pricing strategies which might result in losses due to 
the below-cost pricing without have to be concerned about falling stock prices.109 
 
     Favourable dividend policy: A State Council decision in 1994 exempted Chinese 
SOEs from paying dividends through much of the 1990s and 2000s, partly to allow 
them repair their balance sheets but also because of resistance from politically 
influential SOE managers.110 This practice changed in 2007 when the State Council 
104 S Lubman, ‘China’s State Capitalism: The Real World Implications’ The Wall Street Journal (March 
1, 2012).  
105 USTR (n 20) 68.  
106 Art 53 of the State-owned Assets Law of Enterprise of China,  
107 See e.g., Zhang Buo v. Beijing Jing Gong Garments Group Co. Ltd., Civil Case No. 2985, Beijing 
Intermediate People’s Court (May 20, 2009); Hunan Zheqin Group Co. Ltd., v. Chengdu Yinghua 
Investment Co. Ltd., Civil Case No., Huaihua City Intermediate People’s Court (May 27, 2009).   
108 Whether the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law of China should apply to SOEs used to be a controversial 
topic. The debate delayed the promulgation of China’s Enterprise Bankruptcy Law for many years. The 
new Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, enacted in 2006, applies to all SOEs except 2000 SOEs which are 
specifically singled out by the State Council. See 
<http://finance.sina.com.cn/g/20060828/07252860205.shtml> 
109 TC Brightbill, Testimony before the US- China Economic and Security Review Commission (2012).  
110 N Borst, ‘SOE Dividends and Economic Rebalancing’ (May 11, 2012) 
<http://www.piie.com/blogs/China/?p=1258>   
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launched a reform that aimed to collect dividends from central SOEs and put them 
into a State Capital Management Budget on a pilot basis. Currently, Chinese central 
SOEs are paying 5%- 15% in dividends, which is a much lower dividend payout ratio 
than is common in other firms. 111 This favorable dividend policy gives SOEs an 
advantage over current and potential competitors by keeping their cost of capital low.  
 
     Preferential access to raw materials and other inputs: The Chinese government 
supports its SOEs and other domestic manufacturers by ensuring that they have 
adequate supplies of low-priced raw materials, often at below market prices.112 In 
addition, China has imposed various export restrictions on raw materials and rare 
earth elements, even though China is the largest source of many of these materials. 
This causes problems of supply for manufacturers in other countries, and results in 
Chinese companies – such as those in the state-dominated steel industry – having an 
unfair competitive advantage.113  
 
     Government Procurement: The Chinese government operates a substantial 
government procurement market which it uses to support SOEs and create national 
champions in key industries. 114  A recent study by the European Chamber of 
Commerce estimates the public procurement market in China to be more than twenty 
percent of its national GDP (i.e., $1.07 trillion).115 However, this lucrative market is 
largely closed to foreign invested companies. It has been estimated that 43% of 
Chinese government investment-related procurement and 79% of government 
consumption expenditure were made through state-owned or state-controlled 
enterprises. 116 There are several reasons for the substantial advantages enjoyed by 
SOEs in Chinese government procurement market. First, China has not yet acceded to 
111 The average dividend payout for mature and established industrial firms in the US is 50 to 60 
percent. The average dividend for SOEs in five developed economies was 33 percent. The Chinese 
SOEs that are listed in Hong Kong pay an average dividend of 23 percent. See World Bank, ‘Effective 
Discipline with Adequate Autonomy: The Direction for Further Reform of China’s SOE Dividend 
Policy’ (2009) 12-35.  
112 OECD Steel Committee, ‘A NAFTA Perspective on the Impact of SOEs on the Global Steel Market’ 
(2012), 13 <http://steelnt.org/new/20120531.pdf> 
113 B Karapinar, ‘Export Restrictions and the WTO Law: How to Reform the ‘Regulatory Deficiency’ 
(2011) 45 (6) JWT 1141.  
114 USTR (n 20) 63-4.  
115 European Union Chamber of Commerce in China, ‘European Business in China Position Paper’ 
(2012/2013), 70 <http://europeanchamber.com.cn/en/chamber-publications> 
116 Szamosszegi & Kyle (n 69) 58-9.  
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the WTO’s Government Procurement Agreement and the PRC Government 
Procurement Law requires that the Government should purchase domestic goods, 
projects and services. 117  Second, procurement is conducted by local government, 
which may be predisposed to favour local SOEs. This is not only because the 
management of local SOEs usually has close relations with local government decision 
makers, but also because local SOEs contribute revenues to local coffers and the 
government has a vested interest in their success.118 Third, once a SOE has obtained a 
government procurement contract, it is likely to conduct any related sub-contracting 
through other SOEs.119 
 
     In addition to these financial and regulatory advantages, Chinese SOEs may also 
benefit by having access to government information or data which are not available to 
their private competitors, or are only available to a limited extent.120  
 
     It should be emphasized that the benefits enjoyed by SOEs as a result of their 
particular relationship to the state have been eroded as a result of the extensive SOE 
reforms.121 In addition, following its accession to the WTO, other WTO members, 
either through bilateral dialogues or through WTO litigation, have successfully 
persuaded China to remove many of the policies and measures that have afford SOEs 
special advantages. For example, the WTO Appellate Body recently upheld a Panel 
finding that China had violated several of its commitments by imposing export 
restrictions on raw materials, including bauxite, coke and zinc which were 
inconsistent with its WTO commitments. 122  The 2013 US- China Strategic and 
Economic Dialogue specifically addressed Chinese SOE dividend reform and Chinese 
negotiators agreed to increase the number of SOEs that pay dividends, as well as to 
increase the amount of dividends actually paid.123  
117 Art. 10 of PRC Government Procurement Law. China committed to joining the WTO Government 
Procurement Agreement as part of its WTO Accession in 2001, but the terms of its GPA membership 
are still under negotiation. See WTO, China Announces Next Step in Joining Government Procurement 
Agreement <http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news12_e/gpro_18jul12_e.htm> 
118 CE Bai et al, ‘Local Protectionism and Regional Specialization: Evidence from China’s Industries’ 
(2003), 1-35 <http://www.wdi.umich.edu/files/publications/workingpapers/wp565.pdf> 
119 Szamosszegi & Kyle (n 69) 57.  
120 Capobianco and Christiansen (n 92) 7.  
121 Hassard (n 62) 511.  
122 WTO Appellate Body Report, China- Measures Related to the Exportation of Raw Materials 
Restrictions (Jan 30, 2012) WT/DS394/AB/R.  
123 US Fact Sheet- Economic track of the Fifth  Meeting of the US- China Strategic and Economic 
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III. STATE CAPITALISM AND THE LAW OF WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 
 
Even before its accession to the WTO, the existence of a large number of SOEs in 
China was perceived as being fundamentally incompatible with the world trading 
system. 124  The Chinese government’s prominent economic role a decade after it 
joined the WTO throws doubt on expectations that WTO membership would cause 
China to pull back from market interventions.125 It is thus necessary to examine what 
WTO rules are relevant to confront China’s state capitalism and to what extent these 
rules are effective in curbing it.  
 
     It is important to note that when China acceded to the WTO in 2001 it agreed to be 
bound by a large number of special rules that elaborate, expand, modify or deviate 
from the provisions of the general WTO Agreements. These China-specific rules are 
set out in the WTO Accession Protocol (the Protocol) and in the more than 140 
paragraphs of the Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China which are 
incorporated into it.126 As an integral part of the WTO Agreements, the China-specific 
rules contained in China’s accession commitments are enforceable through the WTO 
dispute settlement processes. 127 These disciplines put additional constraints on the 
activities and financial situation of China’s SOEs.   
 
A. The Ownership-Neutral Philosophy of the World Trading System  
 
The post- World War II international trading system is based on rules and principles 
Dialogue (7/12/2013) < http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2010.aspx>. > 
124 G Hufbauer, ‘China as an Economic Actor on the World Stage: An Overview’, in F Abbott (ed), 
China in the World Trading System: Defining the Principle of Engagement (kluwer Law International 
1998) 50; See also JH Jackson, ‘The Impact of China’s Accession on the WTO’, in D Cass, B Williams 
and G Barker (eds), China and the World Trading System (Cambridge University Press 2003) 26.  
125 HB Malhotra, Chinese Communists Keeping Hands in All Pockets (November 30, 2011), 
<http://www.theepochtimes.com/n2/business/chinese-communists-keeping-hands-in-all-pockets-
151064.html> 
126 Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, WT/L/432 (10 November 2001). JY 
Qin, ‘WTO-Plus” Obligations and Their Implications for the WTO Legal System: An Appraisal of the 
China Accession Protocol’ (2003) 37(3) JWT 483. 
127 WTO Appellate Body Report, China – Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services 
for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, WT/DS363/AB/R (21 December 
2009) para 133-40.    
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that often assume the existence of a market-oriented economy where enterprises make 
decisions on the basis of economic factors rather than government directives.128 Still, 
the WTO does not prescribe any particular economic system for its members and 
states with non-market economies have been accepted into the GATT/WTO 
membership. 129  In addition, most GATT/WTO rules address governments only in 
their role as regulator of economic activities. Little is said about government 
participation in economic activities through SOEs. Indeed, the GATT/WTO does not 
impose on members any particular obligations with respect to property ownership.130 
A WTO member is free to establish and maintain SOEs if it wishes to do so.   
 
     There are several reasons for the WTO’s ownership-neutral position. First, as Qin 
points out, a basic principle of public international law is that each state has the 
sovereign right to choose freely its own political, social and economic system. States 
still hold divergent views as to the proper roles of the government and the state-owned 
sector in the national economy and finding the right mix of public and private 
ownership remains a challenge for many countries. 131  Second, governments may 
instruct SOEs to engage in numerous forms of business practice that discriminate 
against foreign goods and services and possibly undermine the GATT/WTO 
commitments. 132  Such restrictive practices may include being the exclusive 
importer/exporter of a product, using government funds for subsidizing domestic 
production and trade, and controlling product standards, etc. However, such practices 
are not restricted to entities that are owned or controlled by the state. Besides, the 
underlying sources of such trade distortion are usually the special rights and privileges 
which are enjoyed by SOEs. 133  Thus public ownership is not what matters. The 
regulatory focus should be on the behavior of those SOEs which are granted special 
rights and privileges.134 Finally, from a practical point of view, how capital should be 
128 WJ Davey, ‘Article XVII GATT: An Overview’, in T Cottier and P Mavoidis (eds), State Trading in 
the Twenty-First Century (the University of Michigan Press 1998) 21.  
129 JH Jackson, The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations (The 
MIT Press 1997) 328.  
130 PC Mavroidis and T Cottier, ‘State Trading in the Twenty- First Century: An Overview’ in Cottier 
and Mavoidis (eds) (n 128) 3.  
131 Qin (n 99) 899-900.   
132 EU Petersmann, ‘GATT Law on State Trading Enterprises: Critical Evaluation of Article XVII and 
Proposals for Reform’, in Cottier and Mavoidis (n 128) 72. 
133 ibid.  
134 BM Hoekman and P Low, ‘State Trading: Rule Making Alternatives for Entities with Exclusive 
Rights’ in Cottier and Mavoidis (eds) (n 128) 329. 
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formed and whether or not SOEs should be dismantled are fundamental choices of 
domestic policy making. International law cannot, nor should it, prescribe such basic 
choices if it is to remain effective.135 Accordingly, it is suggested that the WTO law 
should not take sides by prescribing basic choices related to the organization of its 
members’ economy and remain neutral as regards questions concerning the formation 
and ownership of capital, whether private or public.136  
 
     Based on this reasoning, WTO disciplines contain few rules specifically relating to 
SOEs. With respect to trade in goods, GATT Article XVII sets out the basic 
disciplines concerning state trading firms, but Article XVII does not refer to the 
ownership of such entities.137 Similarly, although the SCM Agreement expresses a 
preference for privatization in developing countries, it does not impose any obligation 
regarding SOEs. 138  Of course, whether the ownership-neutral philosophy of the 
GATT/WTO permits it to respond effectively to all the challenges posed by SOEs is a 
debatable issue.   
 
B. State Trading Enterprises   
 
The original parties to the GATT were aware of the danger that some Member 
governments might create SOEs in order to circumvent their obligations under the 
GATT. At the same time, those parties could not agree on imposing greater 
restrictions on SOEs than on private enterprises. 139  Consequently, only a few 
provisions in the WTO Agreements explicitly address SOEs. The most important is 
Article XVII of the GATT 1994. Article XVII:1(a) requires that State Trading 
Enterprises (STEs) shall act in a manner consistent with the general principles of non-
discriminatory treatment under the GATT. Article XVII: 1 (b) requires that STEs shall 
make any purchases or sales solely on the basis of commercial considerations. Article 
XVII is intended to ensure that members do not use STEs to escape or circumvent 
their GATT obligations.140  
135 T Cottier and P Mavoidis, ‘Conclusions: The Reach of International Trade Law’ in Cottier and P 
Mavoidis (eds) (n 128) 400. 
136 ibid 397.  
137 Qin (n 99) 900. 
138 Art 27.13 of the SCM Agreement.  
139 Xuejun XIE, ‘WTO Rules on State-owned Enterprises and Implications for Chinese SOE Reforms’ 
(2002) Perspectives  
<http://www.oycf.org/oycfold/httpdocs/Perspectives/18_093002/WTO_Rules.htm> 
140 WTO Appellate Body Report, Canada- Measures Relating to Export of Wheat and Treatment of 
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     The implications of Article XVII for SOEs are limited. First, Article XVII is 
applicable only to STEs, a term which has never been clearly defined in the GATT.141 
A working definition was developed during the Uruguay Round for the purpose of 
notifying the WTO of such enterprises:  
 
…Governmental and non-governmental enterprises, including marketing boards, 
which have been granted exclusive or special rights or privileges, including 
statutory or constitutional powers, in the exercise of which they influence 
through their purchases or sales the level or direction of imports or exports. 
 
     Significantly, this definition covers a private enterprise that receives some special 
rights or privileges that can influence the level or direction of trade.142 On the other 
hand, SOEs are excluded from the definition unless they have a special right or 
privilege and they influence the level or direction of trade through their purchases or 
sales.143 The special right or privilege granted need not be a monopoly position.144 
When China acceded to the WTO in 2001, China was obliged to allow all enterprises 
in China to trade in all goods by 11 December 2004, except for those specified in 
Annex 2 of the Protocol. 145 By virtue of a special national treatment clause in the 
Protocol, this right to trade is also extended to all foreign individuals and entities, 
which have either invested in or are registered in China.146 Thus only a limited 
number of Chinese SOEs may be labeled as STEs under the WTO law.  
 
     Second, the coverage of Article XVII:1 is fairly limited. It is unclear whether the 
obligation of STEs to ‘act in a manner consistent with the general principles of non-
discriminatory treatment under the GATT’ refers only to most-favoured nation 
treatment of trade with other countries or also national treatment of imported and like 
domestic goods. In several GATT disputes, Panels have ruled in favour of the 
Imported Grain, WT/DS276/AB/R (30 August 2004) para 85.  
141 WTO, Technical Information on State-Trading Enterprises, 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/statra_e/statra_info_e.htm> 
142 Qin (n 99) 901.  
143 Petersmann (n 132) 80.  
144 WTO (n 141). 
145 Art 5.2 of the China’ s Accession Protocol.  
146 JY Qin, ‘Trade, Investment and Beyond: The Impact of WTO Accession on China’s Legal System’ 
(2007) The China Quarterly 726.  
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narrower interpretation. 147  In addition, in Canada- Wheat, the Appellate Body 
concluded that Article XVII:1 (a) sets out an obligation of non-discrimination and that 
Article XVII:1(b) clarifies the scope of that obligation. 148  The Appellate Body 
rejected the US argument that XVII:1(b) establishes a separate, general competition-
law-type obligation on state trading enterprises to follow ‘commercial considerations’ 
in all of their purchases and sales.149 As a result, Article XVII:1 allows STEs to act in 
an anti-competitive manner insofar as such action does not violate the obligation of 
non-discrimination.150   
 
     However, although the general thrust of Article XVII of the GATT 1994 is weak, 
Chinese SOEs are not able to benefit from such weakness. The Protocol extends the 
WTO disciplines concerning STEs to all Chinese SOEs, regardless of whether they 
engage in export or import trade.151 The Protocol requires the Chinese government to 
ensure that all SOEs operate according to market economy principles and also 
requires it not to meddle with the autonomous operation of SOEs. Specifically, it 
provides that: 
 
China would ensure that all state-owned and state-invested enterprises would 
make purchases and sales based solely on commercial considerations, e.g., price, 
quality, marketability and availability, and that the enterprises of other WTO 
Members would have an adequate opportunity to compete for sales to and 
purchases from these enterprises on non-discriminatory terms and conditions. In 
addition, the Government of China would not influence, directly or indirectly, 
commercial decisions on the part of state-owned or state-invested enterprises, 
including on the quantity, value or country of origin of any goods purchased or 
sold, except in a manner consistent with the WTO Agreement. 152  
 
C. The SCM Agreement and Countervailing Duties against China  
 
1. The SCM Agreement and China’s WTO Accession Protocol  
 
147 Petersmann (n 132) 80-1.  
148 WTO Appellate Body Report, Canada- Wheat (n 140) para 145. 
149 ibid.   
150 Nakagawa (n 93) 6.  
151 Qin (n 99) 884.  
152 Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China, WT/ACC/CHN/49 (1 October 2001) para 
46.  
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In a market economy the only way a government can affect trade through SOEs that 
do not enjoy monopoly rights is through the provision of subsidies.153 It has long been 
recognized that while subsidies are widely used by governments to promote national 
policy objectives, they may have adverse effects on the interests of other countries 
involved in international trade.154 Countervailing duty (CVD) laws are designed to 
provide relief to domestic industries that have been materially injured, or are 
threatened with material injury, by imported goods that have been subsidized by a 
foreign government or other public entity. The relief provided takes the form of an 
additional import duty on the subsidized imports.  
 
     The SCM Agreement, which supplements the relevant provisions of Articles VI 
and XVI of the GATT, sets out obligations, rights and remedies regarding government 
subsidies of goods and the imposition of CVDs on subsidized imports. By virtue of 
the Protocol, China agreed to be fully subject to the general WTO disciplines on 
subsidies upon its accession. Key to the WTO subsidy disciplines is the definition of a 
subsidy. In accordance with Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement, a subsidy shall be 
deemed to exist if two distinct elements are present: (i) a financial contribution by a 
government or any public body, by which (ii) a ‘benefit’ is conferred. To put it 
differently, this ‘captures situations in which something of economic value is 
transferred by a government to the advantage of a recipient’. 155 Moreover, to be 
subject to the disciplines of the SCM Agreement, the subsidy must be specific.156  
 
     A financial contribution is defined as a direct transfer or potential direct transfer of 
funds, foregoing government revenue otherwise due - such as tax credits, and the 
provision of goods and services other than general infrastructure, or purchase of 
goods by the government. 157  The case law shows that the Appellate Body has 
endorsed a broad interpretation of these three different kinds of financial 
contributions. 158 For example, as to the direct transfer of funds and liabilities, in 
153 F Roessler, ‘State Trading and Trade Liberalization’ in MM Kostechi (ed), State Trading in 
International Markets (macmillan 1982) 264. 
154 B Kyle & RW Staiger, ‘Will International Rules on Subsidies Disrupt the World Trading System?’ 
(2006) 96 Am. Econ. Rev. 877-895.  
155 WTO Appellate Body Report, US- Final Countervailing Duty Determination with Respect to 
Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, WT/DS257/AB/R (19 January 2004) para 51.  
156 Art 1.2 of the SCM Agreement.  
157 Art 1.1 (a) (i) of the SCM Agreement.  
158 J Wouters and D Coppens, ‘An Overview of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures’ in KW Bagwell, GA Bermann and PC Mavroidis, Law and Economics of Contingent 
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Japan – DRAMs Countervailing Duties the Appellate Body indicated that the term 
‘funds’ encompassed not only ‘money’ but also financial resources and other financial 
claims more generally. 159  Consequently, debt forgiveness, the extension of loan 
maturity, and an interest rate reduction are all considered direct transfers of funds 
within the meaning of Article 1.1 (a) (1) (i) because the financial position of the 
borrower is improved.160  
 
     To be labeled a subsidy under the SCM Agreement, the financial contribution 
should confer a ‘benefit’. Whereas the financial contribution element focuses on the 
government and the public body, when determining whether there is a benefit the 
focus shifts toward the recipient of the contribution.161 In Canada – Aircraft, the 
Appellate Body found that a government financial contribution confers a benefit if the 
financial contribution makes the recipient ‘better off’ than it would otherwise have 
been, absent the contribution, and that the marketplace provides an appropriate basis 
for such a comparison. 162  In this connection, Article 14 of the SCM Agreement 
prescribes the conditions under which government provision of equity capital, loans 
and loan guarantees, or goods and services or purchase of goods can be considered as 
conferring a benefit. 
 
     Specificity is not a constitutive element of a subsidy, but it is a necessary condition 
if that subsidy is to be subject to the disciplines of the SCM Agreement.163 Only 
subsidies that are specific to certain enterprises, i.e., an enterprise or industry or 
enterprises or industries that are known and particularized, rather than being generally 
available throughout the economy of a WTO Member, are countervailable. 164 The 
rationale for the specificity requirement reflects the view that only specific financial 
contributions can lead to trade distortion.165 The SCM Agreement targets, first of all, 
Protection in International Trade (Cambridge University Press 2010) 15.  
159 WTO Appellate Body Report, Japan- Countervailing Duties on Dynamic Random Access Memories 
from Korea, WT/DS336/AB/R (December 17, 2007) para 250.  
160 ibid, para 251.  
161 WTO Appellate Body Report, Canada- Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, 
WT/DS70/AB/R (20 August 1999) para 156.  
162 ibid, para 157.  
163 Art 1.2 of the SCM Agreement.  
164 WTO Appellate Body Report, United States – Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties 
on Certain Products from China (‘US – Antidumping and Countervailing Duties’), WT/DS379/AB/R 
(11 March 2011) para 373.  
165 PC Mavroidis, Trade in Goods (Oxford University Press 2012) 549.  
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‘de jure specificity’, ie, situations in which the subsidy is explicitly limited to certain 
enterprises. When seeking to determine if there is de jure specificity the focus is on 
whether only certain enterprises are eligible for the subsidy while the access to that 
subsidy is limited for other enterprises. 166 In addition, an apparently non-specific 
subsidy may be de facto specific and thus also be subject to the disciplines of the 
SCM Agreement. Article 2.1 (c) lists four factors that can be taken into consideration 
when determining whether a subsidy is de facto specific.167  
 
     Once it has been determined that there is a specific subsidy for the purposes of the 
SCM Agreement, a traffic light metaphor is then used in order to categorize subsidies. 
Export subsidies and import substitution subsidies are principally prohibited by their 
very nature because of their direct trade-distorting effect, and so are given a ‘red’ 
light.168 Prohibited subsidies are also presumed to be specific.169 All other subsidies 
are actionable subsidies (a ‘yellow’ light), meaning that they can be challenged or 
countervailed if they cause adverse effects. At present, no type of subsidy qualifies for 
a ‘green’ light under the SCM Agreement.170  
 
     An importing Member can only unilaterally impose CVDs to offset the adverse 
effects of the subsidy in its domestic market.171 In a unilateral action, CVDs may only 
be imposed pursuant to an investigation conducted in accordance with the procedural 
and substantive obligations provided for by the SCM Agreement. This investigation 
should determine the existence of three substantive elements: (1) the existence of a 
specific subsidy; (2) injury to the domestic industry producing the like product; and 
(3) a causal link between the subsidized import and the injury.172  
 
     The Protocol contains a number of special provisions which are only applicable to 
China. Article 14 provides that, when determining the amount a benefit, the prevailing 
166 WTO Appellate Body Report (n 164) para 368.  
167 Art 2.1 (c) of the SCM Agreement.  
168 Art 3 of the SCM Agreement.  
169 Art 3 and 2.3 of the SCM Agreement.  
170 Three categories of subsidies were non-actionable before 2000. However, the category of green light 
subsidies expired at the end of 1999. R Howse, ‘Do the World Trade Organization Disciplines on 
Domestic Disciplines Make Sense? The Case for Legalizing Some Subsidies’ in Bagwell, Bermann & 
Mavroidis (n 158) 85-102.  
171 M Matsushita, TJ Schoenbaum and P Mavroidis, The World Trade Organization- Law, Practice and 
Policy (Oxford University Press 2006) 336. See also Art 10, footnote 35 of the SCM Agreement. 
172 Art 11.2 of the SCM Agreement.  
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conditions in the domestic market of the WTO member seeking to defend itself should 
be used as a benchmark. Section 15 (b) of the Protocol, however, explicitly authorizes 
a departure from the Article 14 guidelines and allows WTO Members to use the so-
called ‘non-market economy (NME) methodologies’ to calculate the amount of a 
subsidy granted by the Chinese government. Section 15 (b) of the Protocol reads:  
 
The importing member may use methodologies for identifying and measuring the 
subsidy benefit which take into account the possibility that prevailing terms and 
conditions in China may not always be available as appropriate benchmarks.  
 
     Clearly, section 15 (b) permits an importing member to resort to alternative 
benchmarks in order to calculate the amount of a subsidy if it finds that the prevailing 
conditions in China inappropriate to be used as such. As the Appellate Body 
commented, this ‘affords importing WTO Members investigating Chinese imports 
additional flexibility in the methodology used to identify and measure subsidy 
benefits’. 173  The provision necessarily presumes that the extensive governmental 
intervention and less developed market conditions in China may not always offer 
appropriate market benchmarks against which to calculate the amount of a subsidy. 
Section 15 (b) of the Protocol has two peculiar characteristics. First, this brief text 
lacks both substantive and procedural detail to guide members in practice. The 
implementation of this provision seems to be left entirely to the discretion of the 
importing member. 174  For example, what factors should an importing member 
consider when judging the appropriateness of prevailing conditions in China? How 
should it choose alternative benchmarks when Chinese benchmarks are found to be 
inappropriate in the relevant proceedings? The failure to specify necessary conditions 
when authorizing the use of alterative benchmarks runs the risk of permitting the 
abuse of what could  be a powerful protectionist tool. Second, and partly due to the 
first characteristic, such alternative benchmarks may always be used by other WTO 
Members, regardless of the actual conditions within the Chinese economy.175 This is 
in sharp contrast to the special antidumping provisions in the Protocol, which 
expressly stipulate that the use of NME antidumping methodologies will not be 
applicable to Chinese exports from 2016.176  
 
     In addition, Section 10.2 of the Protocol prescribes a special SOE-based specificity 
173 WTO Appellate Body Report (n 164) para 436 and footnote 401.  
174 Qin (n 99) 903.   
175 ibid 904.  
176 Art 15 (d) of China’s WTO Accession Protocol.  
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test. It reads: 
 
For purposes of applying Article 1.2 and 2 of the SCM Agreement, subsidies 
provided to state-owned enterprises will be viewed as specific if, inter alia, state-
owned enterprises are the predominant recipients of such subsidies or state-
owned enterprises receive disproportionately large amounts of such subsidies.  
 
     If the Chinese government explicitly permits only SOEs or its favored enterprises 
to have access to a subsidy, then that subsidy is de jure specific. In WTO case law, it 
is usually much more difficult to determine whether a subsidy is de facto specific. 
Under the Protocol, however, the difficult weighing and balancing exercise under 
Article 2.1 (c) of the SCM Agreement is reduced to a finding of one of the two 
conditions in section 10.2 of the Protocol. This will make it easier to find that a 
subsidy provided to a SOE by the Chinese government is specific.177 
 
D. The US- Antidumping and Countervailing Duties Case 
 
Even though the Protocol allows importing members to resort to special rules when 
imposing CVDs against Chinese goods, it is only since 2004 that China has become a 
target of CVD investigations and only since 2005 that effective countervailing 
measures have been put in place.178 Traditionally, the US refused to apply CVD laws 
to NMEs such as China, largely as a result of a 1984 determination by the Department 
of Commerce (USDOC) that there was no adequate way to measure market 
distortions caused by subsidies in an economy that is not based on market 
principles.179 The turning point came in 2006 when the USDOC announced that it had 
initiated a CVD investigation into China with respect to coated free-sheet paper.180 To 
support its decision, the USDOC reasoned that the rationale used to prevent CVD law 
from applying to nonmarket economies in Georgetown Steel in 1984 no longer held 
true for modern-day China.181 The Chinese paper manufacturers sought an injunction 
177 Drake (n 19).  
178 D Ahn and J Lee, ‘Countervailing Duty against China: Opening a Pandora’s Box in the WTO 
System?’ (2011) 14 (2) JIEL 346. 
179 Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Czechoslovakia, Final Negative Countervailing Duty Determination, 
49 Federal Register 19, 370, 19, 371 (May 7, 1984).   
180 Notice of Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigations: Coated Free Sheet Paper from the 
People’s Republic of China, Indonesia and the Republic of Korea, 71 Federal Register 68, 546 
(November 27, 2006).  
181 USDOC, Countervailing Duty Investigation of Coated Free Sheet Paper from the People’s Republic 
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from the US Court of International Trade claiming that the USDOC was prohibited by 
the Georgetown Steel ruling from conducting CVD investigations against NMEs such 
as China. 182 The Court of International Trade declined to issue the injunction on 
jurisdictional issues but cast doubt on China’s claim that the USDOC is prohibited 
from applying CVD law to NMEs.183 Although CVDs were not imposed in the Coated 
Free-sheet Paper case because the US International Trade Commission made a 
negative final determination on injury, it opened a ‘Pandora’s Box’ of CVD petitions 
and impositions of CVDs on Chinese goods. As of September 2012, a total of 24 
countervailing measures were in force against China. In 2009 alone, the USDOC 
initiated ten countervailing duty investigations regarding Chinese products. 184  In 
response to this flood of CVD investigations against Chinese goods, the Chinese 
government brought the US before the WTO dispute settlement body (DSB) in 2009 
and the Appellate Body issued its report in March 2011.185 The Appellate Body report 
clarified several important issues relating to the imposition of CVDs on Chinese 
goods and it has profound implications for counteracting China’s state capitalism.  
 
1. SOEs and State-Owned Commercial Banks (SOCBs) as ‘Public Bodies’   
 
In US – Antidumping and Countervailing Duties, the Panel was confronted with the 
issue of whether Chinese SOEs and SOCBs are ‘public bodies’. This determination is 
important because, if SOEs and SOCBs were regarded as public bodies, then any 
provision of goods or services by SOEs and SOCBs to other market entities would be 
regarded as a ‘financial contribution’ and potentially fall within the ambit of the SCM 
Agreement. The Panel interpreted the term ‘public body’ in Article 1.1 (a) (1) of the 
SCM Agreement as ‘any entity controlled by a government’. The Panel considered 
government ownership to be highly relevant and potentially dispositive evidence of 
government control. Since the Chinese SOEs  and SOCBs at issue were majority-
owned by the Chinese government, the Panel sided with the USDOC that they were 
of China – Whether the Analytical Elements of the Georgetown Steel Opinion are Applicable to 
China’s Present-Day Economy (May 29, 2007).  
182 Government of the People’s Republic of China v. United States, 483 F. Supp. 2d 1274 (Ct. Int’l 
Trade 2007).  
183 ibid 1282. The court said that the Georgetown Steel court only affirmed USDOC’s decision not to 
apply CVD law to the NMEs in question in that particular case and recognized the continuing broad 
discretion of the agency to determine whether to apply CVD law to NMEs.  
184 Ahn and Lee (n 178) 346.  
185 WTO Appellate Body Report (n 164).   
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‘public bodies’.186  
 
     The Appellate Body rejected the notion that the mere fact of governmental 
majority control is sufficient to render a state-controlled entity ‘public body’. Rather, 
it saw the concept of ‘public body’ as sharing certain attributes with the concept of 
‘government’. The Appellate Body emphasized that a ‘public body’ within the 
meaning of the SCM Agreement must be an entity that possesses, exercises or is 
vested with governmental authority.187 To make such a determination, investigating 
authorities should engage in a careful evaluation of the core features of the entity 
concerned and its relationship with government, having regard, in particular, to 
whether the entity exercises authority on behalf of the government.188 In any case, 
apart from an express delegation of authority in a legal instrument, the mere fact that a 
government is the majority shareholder of an entity is unlikely to be sufficient to 
establish the necessary possession of governmental authority.189  
 
     Undoubtedly, the Appellate Body’s interpretation of ‘public body’ has narrowed 
the range of what entities might be considered to be such.190 However, it is important 
to note that its ruling addressed only the manner of the Panel and the USDOC’s 
examination of Chinese SOEs and it was not handing down a final verdict on the legal 
nature of Chinese SOEs more generally. In other words, the Appellate Body did not 
rule out the possibility that Chinese SOEs might be viewed as ‘public bodies’ in future 
CVD investigations if, besides majority government ownership, there was additional 
evidence showing that the Chinese government exercises meaningful control .191 As 
the Appellate Body commented:  
 
In our view, the evidence that a government exercises meaningful control over an 
entity and its conduct may serve, in certain circumstances, as evidence that the 
relevant entity possess governmental authority and exercises such authority in 
the performance of governmental functions.192  
 
186 ibid para 278.  
187 ibid para 317.  
188 ibid para 319.  
189 Ibid para 318.  
190 E Vermulst, ‘Concurrent Trade Defense Investigations in the EU, the EU’s New Anti-subsidy 
Practice against China, and the Future of Both’ (2012) 11 (3) WTR 530. 
191 WTO Appellate Body Report (n 164) para 318.  
192 ibid.  
 32 
                                                     
     It will be very interesting to watch the application of the Appellate Body’s ‘public 
body’ legal standard to Chinese SOEs in future trade disputes. As has been seen in 
Part II above, Chinese SOEs have undergone extensive reforms in the past three 
decades. They are today fundamentally different from their predecessors, which were 
essentially arms of state bureaucracy and as such were not separate from the political 
or administrative authorities. Post- reform Chinese SOEs now enjoy a large degree of 
autonomy and have responsibility to make business decisions in accordance with 
market conditions. Administrative interference in the day-to-day management of the 
SOEs is prohibited by law. Financial performance weighs heavily in the annual and 
triennial evaluations of SOE executives, which in turn determines their remuneration 
and career prospects. Modern corporate governance structures have been established 
which rival the best western corporations.193 Many SOEs are also listed in domestic 
and international stock markets and comply with the rigorous supervision standards 
which stock market regulators require. All the evidence confirms that the ‘new’ 
Chinese SOEs should be viewed differently from their predecessors. At the same time, 
however, there should be no denying that the relationship between Chinese SOEs and 
the Chinese government is unique and vastly different from the conventional 
expectation of government-enterprise relationship in the western world. Significantly, 
the CCP has retained inviolate power to appoint and remove SOE executives. This 
mechanism has created strong incentives for executives to comply with CCP diktats. 
Indeed, in much of the literature they are called ‘quasi government officials’ because 
many successful SOE executives have been promoted to senior positions in 
government bureaucracies or party organs.194  
 
     In US – Antidumping and Countervailing Duties, the Appellate Body emphasized 
that a ‘public body’ determination involves a careful evaluation of the core features of 
the entity concerned and its relationship with government, having regard, in 
particular, to whether the entity exercises authority on behalf of government. 195 
Suppose that the USDOC had not solely relied on the Chinese government’s majority 
ownership of the SOEs under investigation, but instead focused on evaluating the core 
features of these SOEs and their relationship with the Chinese government as advised 
by the Appellate Body, what conclusion might the USDOC have draw from such an 
analysis?  
 
     It is immediately clear that the legal standard formulated by the Appellate Body to 
193 Musacchio and F Flores- Macias (n 63). 
194 Brodsgaard (n 65) 641.  
195 WTO Appellate Body Report (n 164) para 319.  
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evaluate whether or not an entity is a ‘public body’ is quite ambiguous.196 What is 
governmental authority? How can it be determined whether or not an entity possesses, 
exercises or is vested with governmental authority? In reality, is it possible for an 
investigating authority to show that a government exercises meaningful control over a 
company when it has not expressly mandated that company to perform certain 
functions and has avoided giving any other indicia?197 Given the fact that the CCP 
controls the appointment of all major SOE executives and that SOE executives have 
incentives to follow government policy decisions, could it be concluded that a SOE 
possesses, exercises or is vested with governmental authority solely on this basis? If 
not, what additional factors should be looked at? The Appellate Body suggests that 
such an analysis should pay particular regard to whether the entity exercises authority 
on behalf of government. Does this mean that being vested with governmental 
authority itself would not be sufficient? Should whether the functions or conduct be of 
a kind that is ordinarily classified as governmental in the legal order of the relevant 
WTO Member be a relevant consideration?198 Since Chinese SOEs at different levels 
(e.g., central SOEs and local SOEs, different industries and different stages of 
SASAC-led reform) have different relationships with the Chinese government, a case-
by-case analysis of each relationship seems to be required. As the burden of proof 
rests with the investigating authority, one may wonder if the ‘public body’ 
determination is an excessively burdensome test.199  
 
     Admittedly, the Appellate Body’s public body analysis, at it now stands, leaves 
some uncertainties. It would be much more straightforward, as some have suggested, 
to regard all sorts of government-controlled bodies, including SOEs, that could easily 
be used by a government to channel or generate a financial contribution as ‘public 
bodies’. Such a categorization is neither a problem nor wrongful because if CVDs 
were to be imposed, other conditions - such as ‘benefit’ and ‘specificity’ - must also 
be met. 200 However, I would argue that many criticisms of the Appellate Body’s 
analysis are not well founded, and at the same time underestimated the systemic 
196 M Cartland, G Depayre & J Woznowski, ‘Is Something Going Wrong in the WTO Dispute 
Settlement?’ (2012) 46 JWT 1011; J Pauwelyn, ‘Treaty Interpretation or Activism? Comments on the 
AB Report on United States- ADs and CVDs on Certain Products from China’ (2013) 12 WTR 235, 
236.  
197 ibid 1010.  
198 A Dukgeun, ‘United States- Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Products from China’ (2011) 105 (4) AJIL 764.  
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implications of the alternative interpretative approaches which they suggest.  
 
To begin with, the Appellate Body approach recognizes the possibility that modern 
SOEs may be run as genuine commercial enterprises and operate on a level playing 
field with private enterprises. If so, SOEs should not be treated differently simply 
because they are majority-owned by a government. Second, if SOEs were labelled as 
‘public bodies’ without a careful evaluation of their core features, any goods and 
services provided by a SOE to other enterprises would be automatically considered as 
a ‘financial contribution’. Though this determination will not necessarily lead to an 
imposition of CVDs, one may argue that the rights of WTO Members owning SOEs 
under the SCM Agreement are diminished by the Appellate Body’s interpretation. 
This is especially the case for China. If all Chinese SOEs were considered as ‘public 
bodies’, then the first prong of the subsidy definition would be automatically fulfilled. 
Consider also that when determining the existence of ‘benefit’, the second prong of 
the subsidy definition, investigating authorities frequently refer to out-of-country 
benchmarks. In practice, such comparisons invariably result in a finding that benefit 
exists. The point is that the imposition of CVDs on China would be easier than it 
should be if the investigating authority could dispense with the public body analysis. 
It may well be that an implicit anti-public ownership position is built into the ‘new’ 
approach, as suggested by some WTO commentators. By requiring the investigating 
authority to examine the nature of SOEs, the Appellate Body has demonstrated 
impressive sensibility not to take a rigid position on a politically delicate issue. Such 
political sensibility is necessary to maintain the Appellate Body’s legitimacy as the 
gatekeeper of the multilateral trading system.  
 
     Finally, the legal standard formulated by the Appellate Body is not an 
insurmountable barrier for national investigating authorities to find that some SOEs 
are ‘public bodies’. At the panel stage, China argued that the USDOC should conduct 
the factual five-factor analysis it had applied in certain prior investigations, in 
particular in Korea- DRAMs, in order to determine whether entities were public 
bodies.201 The five factors that the USDOC had used were: (i) government ownership; 
(ii) government presence on the board of directors; (iii) government control over 
activities; (iv) pursuit of governmental policies or interests; and (v) whether the entity 
was created by statute. The USDOC applied the five-factor analysis to Chinese SOEs 
in at least two investigations, but could not reach a conclusion due to insufficient 
evidence on the record. Some suggested the USDOC’s five-factor analysis to be an 
acceptable formula for fleshing out the Appellate Body’s ‘governmental authority’ 
201 WTO Panel Report, US – Antidumping and Countervailing Duties, WT/DS379/R, para 8.101.  
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test.202  
 
     No matter how the Appellate Body’s legal standard will be applied in practice 
going forward, any evaluation of Chinese SOEs is likely to reveal a mixed picture. 
Some characteristics of Chinese SOEs may suggest that government control is 
manifold and that it does exercise meaningful control over them. Such evidence may 
permit an inference that the SOEs in question exercise governmental authority. This is 
especially the case with regard to central SOEs directly under the supervision of the 
SASAC. Other evidence may suggest that they share many similarities to private 
enterprises. The investigating authority must evaluate and give due consideration to 
all relevant characteristics of the SOE in question before reaching a conclusion.  
 
     This view may be reinforced by the fact that the Appellate Body endorsed the 
Panel’s treatment of Chinese SOCBs as ‘public bodies’, given the scope and extent of 
control over them exercised by the Chinese government.203 In contrast to its dealing 
with SOEs, the Panel’s determination with regard to the SOCBs goes beyond the fact 
that the Chinese government is a majority shareholder. Rather, the determination is 
based on a comprehensive consideration of a few relevant factors including (i) the 
near complete state ownership of the banking sector in China; (ii) Article 34 of the 
Commercial Banking Law, which  states that banks are required to carry out their loan 
business according to the needs of the national economy and social development and 
under the guidance of state industrial policies; (iii) recorded evidence indicating that 
state-owned commercial banks still lack adequate risk management and analytical 
skills; and (iv) the fact that during the investigation, the USDOC did not receive the 
evidence necessary to document in a comprehensive manner the process by which 
loans were requested, granted and evaluated.204 In addition, research reports by the 
OECD and IMF, as well as excerpts from the Bank of China’s Global Offering, also 
support the conclusion that the Chinese banking sector is meaningfully controlled by 
the Chinese government.205 Still, it is not apparent why these facts demonstrated that 
SOCBs are exercising governmental authority. For example, a lack of business flair, 
as illustrated by inadequate risk management and analytical skills and poor loan-
making practices, has little to do with whether the SOCBs are exercising 
governmental authority. Article 34 of the Commercial Banking Law is a very general 
202 TJ Prusa and E Vermulst, ‘United States- Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on 
Certain Products from China: Passing the Buck on Pass-Through’ (2013) 12 WTR 227-228.  
203 WTO Appellate Body Report (n 164) para 355.  
204 ibid para.349.  
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statement and its implications for the SOCBs’ loan business are not clear. The 
conclusion to be drawn from the Appellate Body’s determination of the nature of 
SOCBs is simply that determining whether an entity is a ‘public body’ requires 
something more than there being government majority ownership. What additional 
evidence is needed, however, is not entirely clear at present and the Appellate Body 
seems to enjoy a large degree of discretion when doing so.  
 
2. Specificity  
 
In US – Antidumping and Countervailing Duties, the controversies concerning the 
determination of specificity related to whether the SOCBs preferential lending to the 
tyre industry amounted to de jure specificity under Article 2.1(a), and whether the 
provision of land-use rights amounted to regional specificity under Article 2.2 of the 
SCM Agreement. With regard to the first specificity determination, the Appellate 
Body found that several planning documents at central, provincial and municipal 
levels of government identified the tyre industry as being one of the ‘encouraged 
projects’ and that all SOCBs were instructed to provide financing to that industry.206 
In response to the government plans, both SOCBs and Chinese policy banks provided 
preferential loans to tyre producers, pursuant to the government policies as set out in 
the planning documents. Therefore, the lending by SOCBs to the tyree industry, and 
in particular to those producers who were identified specifically in the planning 
documents, was considered to be de jure specific.207  
 
     The reasoning of the Appellate Body raises some interesting questions. First, 
arguably both the SCM Agreement and the WTO case law fail to provide sufficient 
guidance on what degree of specificity is required.208 In US- Upland Cotton, the Panel 
held that non-specific subsidies are subsidies which are broadly available throughout 
an economy, in contrast to specific subsidies to which access is limited to a 
‘sufficiently discrete segment’ of an economy as to constitute ‘certain enterprises’.209 
Still, how big can ‘certain enterprises’ be without being perceived as being ‘broadly 
available’? In US – Antidumping and Countervailing Duties, in addition to the tyre 
industry, the central planning catalogue has identified 539 ‘encouraged industries’ 
spanning 26 broad sectors of economic activity. The Appellate Body refused to 
206 ibid para 400.  
207 ibid.  
208 Wouters and Coppens (n 158) 29.  
209 WTO Panel Report, United States- Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R (8 September 2004) 
para 7.725.  
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consider whether all of these constituted ‘certain enterprises’, considering such an 
analysis to be unnecessary.210 This is questionable. As Prusa and Vermulst point out, 
even if the tyre industry was identified as one of the encouraged projects and received 
subsidies, this does not necessarily indicate specificity. The focus of the inquiry 
should be whether the tyre producers under investigation receive more subsidies than 
other sectors identified in the Chinese government’s planning documents.211 This is 
because subsidies provided under the same instruments may be regarded as ‘broadly 
available’. In order to meet the specificity requirement, there must be evidence that 
tyre producers have access to certain subsidies not enjoyed by others sectors.  
 
     Second, China raised an important point that access to SOCB loans was not limited 
to the industries which were listed in the planning documents as being in the 
‘encouraged category’ since the ‘permitted’ industries, which are not included, were 
also beneficiaries of such loans. Because the Panel did not make any findings on this 
point, the Appellate Body rejected China’s argument on evidential grounds.212 China’s 
assertions, if true, would certainly strengthen the argument that the subsidies were not 
specific and that the Appellate Body would be required to analyze whether enterprises 
in the ‘encouraged’ category enjoyed, de jure or de facto, access to  subsidies that 
were unavailable to enterprises in the ‘permitted’ category.  
 
     These arguments lead to a perplexing question. If the specificity threshold is set at 
too high a level to be met, is there not a risk that in a country such as China, where 
there are many recipients of subsidies, those subsidies are even less likely to be 
countervailed? It may be precisely because of this concern that the Appellate Body 
has imposed an ‘easier’ specificity threshold than conventionally might have been 
expected. This shows the complexity of applying the SCM Agreement to a state 
capitalism country where the government retains a significant role in resource 
allocation.  
 
     As regards the second issue, the USDOC had determined that the provision of 
land-use rights to the Aifudi Company was regionally specific because the land was 
physically located in an industrial park within the jurisdiction of the Huantai County. 
The Panel found there to be no separate policy for land in the industrial park. If land 
was to be for industrial use, this had to be in accordance with the general industrial 
land policy which was applied uniformly both inside and outside the industrial park. 
210 WTO Appellate Body Report (n 164) para 395.   
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In addition, the Panel found that the USDOC had failed to assess whether the 
provision of land-use rights in the industrial park constituted a ‘distinct regime’- for 
instance, by virtue of price differences- compared with the land-use rights outside the 
industrial park. .213 The Appellate Body agreed with the Panel and rejected the 
USDOC’s determination that the land-use rights in question were regionally specific.   
 
     Given that the Chinese government is the ultimate owner of all land, any time an 
enterprise obtains land-use rights anywhere in China it receives a financial 
contribution from a government. How to determine specificity in relation to the 
provision of land-use rights is likely to be a salient issue in future SCM disputes 
involving China. In this regard it should be noted that in Coated Sheet Paper case, 
and in the absence of cooperation from the Chinese Government, the EU made a 
positive specificity determination based on the following series of facts: (i) some 
provisions of the government’s papermaking plan set out specific rules on industrial 
layout by stating what types of papermaking industries were to be established in 
various geographic regions of the country; (ii) there was evidence that the 
papermaking industry was an ‘encouraged industry’; (iii) there was no functioning 
market for land in China; (iv) the was evidence from cooperating exporting producers 
that land was allocated to them for their papermaking projects.214 In evaluating the 
amount of the benefit conferred, an out-of-country benchmark was used and it turned 
out to be higher than the Chinese domestic land price.215 The EU’s analysis is likely 
to be referred to in future CVD investigations concerning China.  
 
3. Market Distortion and Out-of-Country Benchmarks  
 
In US – Antidumping and Countervailing Duties, the Appellate Body specifically 
dealt with the issue of how to calculate the amount of benefit to the SOEs from the 
subsidies.  Normally, in-country private prices in the country where the goods are 
provided should be used to determine whether any benefit exists. However, in-country 
private prices may be distorted due to the predominance of the government as a 
supplier in the market. Faced with such a scenario, the Appellate Body reaffirmed its 
earlier decision in US- Softwood Lumber VI that the SCM Agreement allows 
investigating authorities to discard in-country private market prices in favor of out-of-
country price benchmarks if it can be showed that in-country private market prices are 
213 ibid para 416.  
214 Council Implementing Regulation 452/2011, Coated Fine Paper from China, Official Journal of the 
European Union (OJ) 2011 L128/18 (definitive countervailing duty) paras 252-258.  
215 ibid. 
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distorted and that alternative out-of-country benchmarks are related to  prevailing 
market conditions in the country under investigation.216 The Appellate Body then held 
that the Chinese government’s predominant role and extensive intervention distorted 
the commercial lending market such that Chinese domestic interest rates were not 
appropriate benchmarks to determine the existence and amount of benefit associated 
with the Renminbi (RMB)-dominated loans from SOCBs. 217  Similarly, the Panel 
determined that China’s provision of land-use rights to the producers investigated for 
an inadequate remuneration constituted a countervailable subsidy.218 The Panel found 
that in-country private prices were not an appropriate basis of comparison when 
determining whether a benefit existed because all land was owned by some level of 
government in China and land prices were distorted by the significant role that the 
government had in the market by prohibiting private land ownership.219  
 
     This ruling by the Appellate Body raised two key questions. First, when are in-
country prices so distorted that they cannot be used as proper benchmarks for the 
calculation of the benefit? Second, if existing in-country private prices are rejected, 
what alternative benchmarks might be used as proxies for the counterfactual 
undistorted market?  
 
a) Market Distortion Analysis  
 
As regards the first question, the Appellate Body made it clear that the decision 
should be made by evaluating the role of the government in the market as a provider 
of the same or similar goods or services. If the government is a significant supplier, 
this fact alone cannot justify a finding that prices are distorted. Evidence pertaining to 
factors other than government market share is needed to prove distortion. However, 
where the government is the predominant supplier, it is likely that private prices will 
be distorted because the government’s own pricing strategy can affect the prices 
charged by private providers for the same goods, though a case-by-case analysis is 
still required.220 In both instances, the investigating authority would have to reach its 
conclusion based on all the available evidence, including evidence regarding factors 
other than government market share.221 Applying this test to the facts of the case, the 
216 WTO Appellate Body Report (n 164) para 446.  
217 ibid para 509.  
218 WTO Panel Report (n 201) para 10.82.  
219 ibid para 10.76- para 10.82.  
220 WTO Appellate Body Report (n 164) para 441.  
221 ibid para 443.  
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Appellate Body found that Chinese SOE suppliers produced 96.1% of all of the 
products in question in China, all of which were majority-owned by the Chinese 
government.222 The Appellate Body considered that this fact made it likely that the 
Chinese government, as the predominant supplier, had the market power to affect the 
pricing of private providers for the same goods, and induce them to be in alignment 
with government prices.223 Since the in-country private prices are very likely to be 
distorted, the Appellate Body concluded that it was appropriate to use out-of-country 
prices, in this case the world market prices as reported in an international industry 
publication, as the benchmark from which to calculate the amount of benefits received 
by the enterprises under investigation.  
 
     The Appellate Body’s ruling clearly shows that the market benchmark which it 
envisages is an undistorted or pure market.224 Implicitly or explicitly, this assumes 
that governments do not normally intervene in market activities.225 The ruling also 
assumes that government or government-affiliated entities will never price their goods 
or services at market rates and so if the government provides a majority, or a 
substantial portion, of the market in question, private prices will be distorted and out-
of-country benchmarks should be sought. The possibility that the government might 
be operating on the basis of market-determined terms is completely ignored. Even 
though the Appellate Body said that it would review the decision on basis of the all 
the available evidence, it stopped short of indicating what additional evidence would 
be considered and how the presumption of market distortion could be overturned in 
trade disputes.226  
 
     A more fundamental question arises from the undistorted market paradigm. 
Clearly, not all government intervention should be considered market-distorting: there 
has to be scope for regulation, for example. But how can legitimate government 
intervention be distinguished from illegitimate government intervention that should be 
countervailed? In US – Antidumping and Countervailing Duties, the Appellate Body 
drew a distinction between a government’s role in implementing monetary policy on 
the one hand, and market distortions that may result from governmental participation 
222 ibid para 455. 
223 ibid.  
224 WT Zheng, ‘The Pitfall of the (Perfect) Market Benchmark: the Case of Countervailing Duty Law’ 
(2010) 19 Minnesota Journal of International Law 23.  
225 DK Tarullo, ‘Beyond Normalcy in the Regulation of International Trade’ (1987) 100 Harv. L. Rev. 
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and intervention in the commercial market, on the other. 227  It rejected Chinese 
domestic interest rates as appropriate benchmarks against which to determine the 
existence and amount of benefit associated with the RMB-dominated loans from 
SOCBs. In other words, it thought that the Chinese government’s control of its 
banking sector somehow ‘crossed the line’. The real issue is where, precisely, the line 
actually is.  
 
     The Appellate Body’s decision is based on several characteristics of the Chinese 
banking sector, including (i) the government’s predominant role and its influence on 
interest rates, as evidenced by various publications by outside institutions; (ii) the fact 
that lending rates in China were largely undifferentiated, with most loans being made 
at rates close to the government-set benchmark rates, which is evidence that market 
forces were not operating and that banks still lacked adequate risk management and 
analysis skills;  (iii) that foreign banks in China were subject to the same 
governmental controls as domestic banks, and finally, (iv) that privately owned 
Chinese banks account for a very small percentage of total lending.228 Even if all 
these allegations were true, it is difficult to see how each of these factors, separately 
or cumulatively, had any effect on the interest rates in question and, in particular, how 
these factors caused RMB’s interest rates to be lower than they would otherwise have 
been. The Appellate Body took the view that there was no specific requirement in the 
SCM Agreement that investigating authorities must show that government prices were 
artificially low in order to reject in-country prices. It simply believed that these 
factors, taken together, distorted the Chinese commercial lending market.229 
 
b) Out-of-Country Benchmark  
 
As discussed above, the problem with the market distortion analysis stems from the 
wide latitude granted to investigating authorities to conduct an essentially free-
wheeling analysis. This problem is further exacerbated by the same latitude granted to 
investigating authorities to choose alternative benchmarks. The essential reason why 
investigating authorities can choose an out-of-country benchmark is to enable them to 
‘replicate reliably market conditions prevailing in one country on the basis of market 
conditions prevailing in another country and that appropriate adjustment would need 
to be made to avoid in particular the countervailing of comparative advantage’.230 In 
227 WTO Appellate Body Report (n 164) para 498.  
228 ibid para 503.  
229 ibid paras 506 and 508.  
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US – Antidumping and Countervailing Duties, the Panel was confronted with the 
question of how to select a proper benchmark for Chinese land-use prices. The Panel 
agreed with the USDOC that prices for certain industrial property in Bangkok and 
adjacent provinces in Thailand might serve as a proper benchmark. In selecting the 
out-of-country benchmark, the USDOC took into consideration a number of factors, 
such as per capita Gross National Income (GNI)  population density, the types of land 
transactions and the type of land at issue (land in industrial zones), etc. 231 
 
     Because land is by definition not traded across borders and because its value is 
largely determined by its location and by the uses to which it may be put, it is almost 
impossible to replicate the prevailing market conditions for land in one country by 
referring to land values in another, which has its own – and different - physical, 
social, political and economic environment. The Panel recognized that this is difficult 
from a practical point of view.232 However, the Panel reasoned that the task of an 
investigating authority is to do its best to identify a benchmark that approximates to 
the market conditions that would prevail in the absence of the distortion. In order to 
do so, the authority must conduct a reasoned analysis based on factual information, 
selected and adjusted as necessary in order that it might be as comparable as possible 
to such market conditions. Nevertheless it remains to be explained why the factors 
considered by the USDOC are appropriate to indicate what the correct price of land 
might be in another country, as it is well-known that appropriate adjustments for 
considerations of this nature are extremely difficult to make and are subject to 
manipulation in ways that can favor domestic interest groups.233  
 
     In US – Antidumping and Countervailing Duties, the Appellate Body seems to 
demand reasonable rationale from WTO Members when they use out-of-country 
benchmarks. In calculating the benefit associated with RMB-denominated loans from 
Chinese SOCBs, the USDOC constructed a proxy - a multi-currency regression model 
based on per capita GNI and institutional quality - as a proper benchmark. China 
challenged the legality of the benchmark, arguing that the USDOC had not provided 
any coherent explanation why these factors made the proxy a proper benchmark. As 
the Panel blindly accepted the USDOC position without rigorous analysis, the 
Appellate Body held that the Panel had violated its obligation to perform an ‘objective 
assessment of the matter’ under Article 11 of the DSU. The Panel was obliged to 
231 WTO Panel Report (n 201) para 10.165. The finding was not appealed.  
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engage in a critical and searching review of whether the reasons put forth by the 
investigating authority could justify the proxy that it constructed, including testing the 
adequacy and reasonableness of the determination in the light of other plausible 
alternative explanations. 234 The practical effect of the ruling should be to impose a 
level of discipline on the use of out-of-country benchmarks that investigating 
authorities might not have otherwise considered to exist.235 In future disputes, the 
construction of a proper out-of-country benchmark will likely be an issue for debate. 
It must be stressed that this controversy does not meaningfully restrict the USDOC’s 
ability to impose CVDs using an out-of-country benchmark. It only requires the 
USDOC to provide more support for the methodology it uses to construct its 
benchmark.  
 
4. IMPLICATIONS FOR CHINESE STATE CAPITALISM    
 
While reducing or eliminating state ownership in the Chinese economy may be a 
desirable goal, it will be a very difficult goal to achieve in the near future. The SOEs 
and SOCBs are tools used by the government to develop China’s economy, carry out 
macroeconomic stimulus, and increasingly to secure economic security and advance 
economic interests abroad.236 In the foreseeable future, the Chinese government will 
continue to offer substantial support and protection to strategic industries and will 
maintain a pivotal role in the allocation of capital to both private and state owned 
enterprises.237 
 
     Although not every governmental act that distorts trade can be considered a 
subsidy, the SCM Agreement is nevertheless broad in scope and wide open for 
interpretation by the WTO adjudicating bodies. 238  The additional disciplines 
embodied in the Protocol further strengthen the disciplines on the Chinese 
government. The Appellate Body ruling in US – Antidumping and Countervailing 
Duties in some ways puts into question the very means by which the Chinese 
government regulates the national economy. Whether SOEs are ‘public bodies’ for the 
purpose of applying the SCM Agreement remains an open question. However, as has 
been analyzed above, it is not unlikely that some SOEs in some cases may be 
regarded as public entities in future SCM disputes. The Chinese government still uses 
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extensive governmental planning and industrial policies to rationalize investment and 
guide economic development. It turns out that such planning has made the specificity 
requirement much easier to meet than expected. Significantly, the Appellate Body did 
not specify the evidentiary standards that must be met before investigating authorities 
can reject in-country private market prices. Nor did it set out the evidentiary standards 
for alternative benchmarks to be considered in relation to prevailing market 
conditions in the country under investigation. The Appellate Body leaves those two 
important decisions largely to the discretion of the investigating authorities. As a 
result, there appears to be a policy of considering all loans made by Chinese 
commercial banks to any of the industries featured in government planning 
documents to be countervailable subsidies. 239  These rulings are likely to have 
significant long-term consequences for the use of CVDs against China.  
  
     The principal findings of the Appellate Body report were quickly followed by 
other WTO Members. The EU completed its first ever CVD investigation against 
China in May 2011. Unsurprisingly, the final ruling showed substantial similarities to 
the US – Antidumping and Countervailing Duties Appellate Body report.240 The EU 
Commission concluded that Chinese SOCBs and policy banks are ‘public bodies’; 
that the interest rates of SOCBs and land prices in China are distorted to the extent 
that resort to out-of-country benchmarks is necessary.241 It can be expected that the 
Appellate Body ruling in US – Antidumping and Countervailing Duties has laid the 
groundwork for WTO Member states’ future CVD investigations on Chinese exports.  
 
     The ruling has profound implications for the further reform of Chinese SOEs as 
well as the banking sector. In order to avoid being categorized as ‘public bodies’, 
SOEs need to be genuine commercial entities making independent business decisions 
and competing with private enterprises on an equal footing. It is not a problem that the 
Chinese government remains the majority shareholder. However, SOEs should not be 
vested with or exercise government authorities. Otherwise, all other companies which 
have made purchases from such SOEs will face the potential threat of CVD 
investigations. It should be noted that the Appellate Body ruling is in fact consistent 
with the Chinese government’s SOE reform objectives. Over the years, China’s SOE 
reforms have been conducted on the principle of separating government 
administration from enterprise management and separating ownership from 
management. The Chinese government is thus well advised to use the Appellate Body 
239 Dukgeun (n 198) 764.  
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ruling as an incentive to push forward further SOE reforms. The more daunting task 
concerns Chinese SOCBs and policy banks. In view of the approach taken by the 
Appellate Body to the indicators determining that China’s commercial lending market 
is distorted, it seems that without far-reaching reforms of the whole financial system, 
including allowing private capital to form commercial banks and enhanced market 
access for foreign banks, out-of-country benchmarks will be used for a long time to 
come. So far, the extent to which the Chinese government is committed to substantial 




Over the past three decades, the Chinese government has strived to move from a 
command economy to a market economy. Extensive economic reforms have produced 
an unparalleled economic miracle in China. However, it is important to understand 
that the Chinese political economy system, generally known as ‘state capitalism’, 
remains fundamentally different from western liberal market capitalism. One key 
feature of China’s state capitalism is that the Chinese government, directly or 
indirectly, controls a large number of powerful SOEs, especially in strategic and key 
sectors. The Chinese government has strengthened these SOEs by streamlining them, 
professionalizing their management and demanding that they take responsibility for 
their own balance sheets. Many of the reforms have been quite successful and many 
Chinese SOEs have emerged as powerful modern enterprises playing significant 
economic and political roles in both the domestic market and the global market. 
However, in order to foster these ‘national champions’ and develop them into 
internationally competitive modern enterprises, the Chinese government has granted 
them a range of fiscal and regulatory advantages. The resulting perception of unfair 
trade has undermined international trade and investment relations between China and 
other WTO Members. 
 
     This article has addressed the question of how WTO law deals with China’s state 
capitalism. After canvassing China’s extensive SOE reforms in the past 30 years, the 
conclusion is that the relationship between Chinese SOEs and the Chinese party-state 
presents a mixed picture. To a very large extent, Chinese SOEs are independent 
market entities who are confronted with competition from Chinese domestic private 
enterprises and foreign-invested enterprises. In addition, the benefits conferred on 
SOEs have been consistently eroded as a result of extensive market-oriented reforms. 
242 F Allen et al.,‘China’s Financial System: Challenges and Opportunities’ (2011) 
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Bilateral and multilateral economic dialogues and WTO litigation have further 
persuaded China to remove measures that provide SOEs with competitive advantages. 
Increasingly, Chinese SOEs are becoming similar to genuine commercial entities and 
their government-provided competitive advantages are disappearing. However, the 
Chinese government still retains a strong influence over SOEs.  
  
     In view of the complicated nature of the government-enterprise relationship in 
China, it is important to conceptualize Chinese SOEs properly. In this connection, the 
WTO case law, especially the recent US – Antidumping and Countervailing Duties, 
has demonstrated that WTO Agreements are remarkably flexible when addressing the 
challenges posed by China’s state capitalism. Indeed, the WTO rules have been 
interpreted in such a manner that many key features of China’s state capitalism could  
easily be challenged by its trading partners in a WTO-consistent manner. This article 
has also identified several gaps in the reasoning of the Appellate Body in US – 
Antidumping and Countervailing Duties and has suggested that such gaps should be 
filled in future WTO dispute settlements.  
 
 47 
